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Resumen:
Esta tesis estudia las estrategias usadas por los fondos de inversión para atraer
inversores, así como las características de éstos asociadas a cada estrategia.
Específicamente, examinaré la política de dividendos y la heterogeneidad en
en características de los inversores a través de los rendimientos esperados y la
política de dividendos. El primer capítulo se centra en cómo los fondos de in-
versión determinan su política de dividendos, i.e. frecuencia con la que éstos
se pagan. Considero que, para determinar su política de dividendos, los fon-
dos necesitan solucionar dos conflictos de intereses: entre nuevos y antiguos
inversores, y entre los inversores existentes. La evidencia empírica que presento
apoya mi argumentación. El segundo capítulo investiga si algunos grupos de
inversores son más propensos a cometer errores (e.g. escogiendo fondos con
comisiones más altas) que otros. Proponemos la utilización de nuevos datos
como las características socio-demográficas de los visitantes a las páginas web
de los fondos , como una aproximación a las características de los inversores en
esos fondos. Los resultados son consistentes con la literatura previa en cuanto a
que inversores de mayor edad y con bajos ingresos son más propensos a comprar
fondos con unas características concretas de las cuales se espera que tendrá un
rendimiento inferior en el futuro. El tercer capítulo intenta aportar nueva evi-
dencia sobre la existencia de clientelas de dividendos en el mercado de fondos
de inversión. Demuestro que inversores de mayor edad y menores ingresos tien-
den a comprar fondos que reparten dividendos con mayor frecuencia con más
probabilidad.

Abstract:
This thesis studies the strategies that mutual funds use to attract individual
investors and the investor characteristics that are associated with the strate-
gies. More specifically, I examine the influence of fund strategies, particu-
larly dividend policy, on investors and how investors react differently to fund
strategies and performance depending on their socio-demographic characteris-
tics. The first chapter addresses the question as to how a mutual fund de-
termines its dividend policy, i.e., the frequency of dividend distributions. I
argue that in determining their dividend policy, mutual funds need to solve
two conflicts of interest: between new and existing investors and within ex-
isting investors. I present empirical evidence that supports the theoretical ar-
guments. The second paper investigates the question of whether some groups
of investors are more prone to making mistakes (e.g., choosing high-fee funds)
than others. I propose a new data set on the socio-demographic characteris-
tics of visitors to mutual fund websites as a proxy for the characteristics of
people investing in those mutual funds. I find results consistent with pre-
vious literature in that old and low-income investors are more likely to buy
mutual funds that are predicted to underperform based on their character-
istics. The third chapter provides direct evidence on the existence of divi-
dend clienteles in the mutual fund market. I document that old and low in-
come investors are more likely to purchase funds with high dividend frequency.

1
Introduction
2 1. Introduction
Over the past decade, the assets managed by mutual funds have increased
dramatically in the US. The assets under management in the US mutual fund
industry grew from $3,526 billion at the beginning of 1998 to $13,045 billion
at the end of 2012.1 The nearly fourfold increase stems from 1) the increase
of equity market; and more interestingly, 2) the net new cash flow, i.e., the
dollar value of new fund sales less redemptions. The Investment Company In-
stitute (ICI) reports that from 2002 to 2012, individual investors (households)
invested an average of $349 billion each year, on net, in long-term registered
investment companies, mainly mutual funds. And 44.4 percent of households
invest in mutual funds. Thus, ICI concludes that millions of individual in-
vestors have increasingly turned to mutual funds to achieve their financial
goals. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how mutual fund strategies
affect investors and how investors react to those strategies, as well as the ef-
fect of investor characteristics on the purchase decisions. More specifically, I
examine the influence of fund strategies, particularly dividend policy, on in-
vestors and how investors react differently to fund strategies and performance
depending on their socio-demographic characteristics.
The compensation for mutual fund management companies is mostly derived
from management fees, charged in the form of a percentage of the assets under
management. To maximize their revenue, mutual funds compete with others
to attract investors. The most important factor in this competition is perfor-
mance. Carhart (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) are among the first to
study the relationship between past performance and net fund flows. They
find that funds with superior past performance are associated with dispropor-
tionately large new money inflows, while poor-performing funds do not suffer
large outflows. The convexity of the relationship between performance and
new cash flow may create the incentives for mutual funds to alter the riskiness
of the portfolios in order to maximize the inflows (Brown et al., 1996; Chevalier
and Ellison, 1997).
Funds also use other strategies to attract new flows. For example, Jain and Wu
(2000) and Gallaher et al. (2006) show that advertising has significantly pos-
itive effects on mutual fund inflows, which suggests that individual investors
follow the advertising to buy mutual funds. Mutual funds also set fees and dis-
tribution channels in order to target different types of investors (Bergstresser
et al., 2009; Christoffersen and Musto, 2002; Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú, 2009).
Barclay et al. (1998) show that mutual funds trade off the welfare of their
existing and new shareholders in choosing the realization policy of unrealized
capital gains. Christoffersen et al. (2005) find that mutual funds make trade
offs within retirement and nonretirment accounts to cater to their sharehold-
ers. More recently, Harris et al. (2012) provide evidence on that some mutual
1All statistics in Introduction are from 2013 Investment Company Fact Book, ICI
3funds purchase high dividend yield stocks before dividend payment dates for
the purpose of increasing dividend incomes, and therefore, receiving larger
inflows.
Despite the positive association between flows and fund strategies, any given
strategy is not likely to be attractive to all investors. For example, though
funds could maximize the expected flows by changing the riskiness of the
portfolios, it may drive away some investors who are sensitive to the risk.
Barclay et al. (1998) and Christoffersen et al. (2005) provide clear evidence
that funds’ strategies sometimes hurts some investors.
It is not always easy to determine who are the investors benefited or hurt by
a certain fund strategy. A clear difference can be made between new and ex-
isting investors, as in Barclay et al. (1998). Mutual funds are supposed to act
in behalf of the existing investors. Yet, some funds might favor new investors
in order to get more inflows. Investors also differ in their socio-demographic
characteristics. Previous studies show that investor preferences, the degree of
sophistication, and thus, behaviors vary across investor characteristics. For
instance, Miller and Modigliani (1961) conjecture that investors with different
characteristics do not have the same attitude toward dividends and, there-
fore, behave differently. Graham and Kumar (2006) and Becker et al. (2011)
find strong empirical evidence supporting this conjecture. Previous literature
also shows that the fees and performance of mutual funds are different across
investor socio-demographic characteristics.2
The primary objective of this thesis is to study the interrelation between fund
strategies and investor characteristics. The thesis is structured in three chap-
ters. Chapter 2 of this thesis examines mutual funds’ choice of dividend pay-
ment frequency, a fund strategy that has been neglected by the literature.
Mutual funds’ dividend payment is not as flexible as firms’, because regula-
tion essentially requires mutual funds to pay out nearly all dividends each
year. However, mutual funds can still decide the frequency of dividend dis-
tributions. This chapter argues that multi-dividend policy hurts mutual fund
shareholders and investigates the reasons why some mutual funds distribute
dividends more frequently than mandated. I propose that funds deliberately
set dividend policy to increase assets under management and, thus, fee rev-
enues. In determining their dividend policy, mutual funds need to solve two
conflicts of interest: (1) between new and existing investors, and (2) within
existing investors with different dividend preferences. The empirical results
show that the probability of a fund choosing a multi-dividend policy is asso-
ciated with fund characteristics that affect both conflicts of interest. We also
2See, for example, Bailey et al. (2011); Engström (2007); Grinblatt et al. (2011); Niebling
et al. (2009); Tang et al. (2010).
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find evidence that multi-dividend policy alters the sensitivity of mutual fund
net flows to the fund characteristics that affect both conflicts of interest.
Chapter 3 investigates an important unresolved question: Who buys those
funds that are expected to underperform? The question is raised by the abun-
dant empirical evidence on the persistence of mutual fund underperformance.
However, attempts to answer this question have been hampered by lack of com-
prehensive data on individual investor decisions in large markets. To overcome
this data limitation, we use the sociodemographic characteristics of US visi-
tors to mutual fund websites to proxy for investor characteristics. We find
that differences in sociodemographic characteristics are systematically associ-
ated with predicted fund performance: Funds with a higher fraction of female,
older or low-income investors are associated with worse predicted performance.
We also find that differences in the optimality of investor choices across in-
vestor sociodemographic groups can be explained by differences in sensitivity
to past performance and fund fees. Finally, there is limited evidence that fund
marketing can explain why some groups of investors buy the underperforming
funds.
Chapter 4 addresses another interesting question: Who is the dividend clientele
in mutual funds? Previous studies show that there is a dividend clientele in
the stock market by identifying its characteristics (Becker et al., 2011; Graham
and Kumar, 2006). The evidence is consistent with the conjecture that older
and low income investors have a preference for the dividends. However, there
is no such study for the mutual fund market. This study is important for us to
better understand the mutual fund market and protect invulnerable investors.
Using the data employed in Chapter 3, I find limited evidence supporting that
older and low income investors buy the funds with more frequent dividend
distribution. The study sheds light on the existence of dividend clienteles and
helps explain the heterogeneity of mutual fund dividend policies.
The thesis contributes to existing research in three ways. First, I document
a new fund strategy, i.e., dividend policy, that has been ignored by prior
literature, but is important to investors. Second, I explore a new Internet
database, which can be used as a proxy for investor characteristics of all US
investors. Such a large scale database with the characteristics of US investors
was not previously available. Third, I provide evidence of dividend clienteles
in the mutual fund market.
2
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.2.1 Introduction and Literature Review
In the US, a mutual fund1 is defined as a regulated investment company in
the US.2 As such, a mutual fund pays dividends to its shareholders, like other
types of corporates.3 However, mutual fund dividend policy is different from
the dividend policy of corporates in many aspects, such as its sources, distri-
butions, and regulations. Therefore, it is surprising that mutual fund dividend
policy receives no attention in contrast to the large body of literature on corpo-
rate dividend policy. This chapter investigates how a mutual fund determines
its dividend policy and its impact on investors.
One possible reason for the lack of academic attention to mutual fund dividend
policy is that a mutual fund has a less flexible dividend policy compared with
a corporate. A corporate determines its dividend policy in terms of “how
much, when and how” during the life of the corporate (DeAngelo et al., 2008).
However, a mutual fund, as described below, is highly regulated in all aspects
and has to pay out all dividends in the form of cash each year. Yet, the rule
does not restrict the frequency of dividend payout. A mutual fund could pay
dividends, if there is any, once or more times per year to mutual fund investors.
Therefore, a mutual fund can still have a dividend policy, namely, the number
of times it pays dividends during the year.
Dividend policy varies across mutual funds. In my sample, 30% of funds choose
a multi-dividend policy, i.e., pay dividends more than once during a year. In-
tuitively, a multi-dividend policy is costly for both investors and mutual funds.
For example, there are transaction costs for mutual funds to pay dividends.
Some of the costs (e.g., transference fees) might be fixed for each distribution.
Therefore, a multi-dividend fund may incur higher transaction costs, which
are ultimately paid by investors. Multi-dividend funds also lose fee revenue on
dividends that not automatically reinvested before the end of the year. These
costs raise the question: Why do many funds choose to pay dividends more
often than mandated?
One possible answer is that mutual funds could attract inflows to the funds
and, therefore, increase fee revenue by deliberately setting dividend policy.
This chapter proposes that dividend policy results in two conflicts of interest:
between existing and new investors, and within existing investors with different
dividend preferences. As a consequence, it is reasonable to suspect that mutual
1Throughout the chapter, we use “mutual funds” or “funds” to refer to retail equity mutual
funds unless otherwise specified.
2See http://www.sec.gov/answers/mfinvco.htm and http://www.sec.gov/answers/mutfund.htm.
3We use corporate to refer to the company other than regulated investment company.
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funds trade off the interests of different investors. This chapter asks three
questions: Does multi-dividend policy hurt existing investors? Do mutual
funds choose their dividend policy to trade off interests of different investors?
Do investors respond to dividend policy?
Retail investors have to pay income taxes on dividends received in the current
year. New investors would prefer to purchase funds with less undistributed
dividends and, therefore, pay less taxes. To attract new investors, some mu-
tual funds might pay dividends more frequently than it is legally required to
lower the tax burden for new investors. However, this policy might hurt exist-
ing investors who, on the contrary, prefer single-dividend policy. Therefore,
mutual funds must trade off the interests of existing and new investors.
The trade-off aforementioned extends the previous literature on mutual funds’
agency problems. The chapter shows evidence that a mutual fund might choose
the optimal dividend policy to maximize its flow and revenue at the cost of
investors. A mutual fund management company’s compensation is mostly
derived from management fees, in the form of a percentage of assets under
management. Mutual funds use two ways to maximize their interest: attract-
ing more flows and/or increasing the fees. For example, Chevalier and Ellison
(1997) and Busse (2001) show that fund managers alter the riskiness of portfo-
lios depending on the fund’s past performance. This operation might increase
the expected inflow because of the convex shape of the relationship between
performance and flows. Barclay et al. (1998) show that mutual funds trade
off the welfare of their existing and new shareholders in choosing the real-
ization policy of unrealized capital gains. These authors provide evidence of
an agency problem resulting from the demand for new investment by mutual
fund managers. To attract new fund inflows, fund managers may realize and
pass through unrealized capital gains and reduce the tax overhang caused by
unrealized gains at the cost of existing investors. More recently, Harris et al.
(2012) show that some mutual funds purchase high dividend yield stocks be-
fore dividend payment dates for the purpose of increasing dividend incomes,
and therefore, receiving larger inflows. Mutual funds also trade off the interest
of different types of investors by setting fees. Christoffersen and Musto (2002)
argue that the pricing of mutual funds depends on their demand curves. As
such, mutual funds might charge high fees to certain types of investors. Gil-
Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2008) theoretically show that some funds might charge
higher fees to unsophisticated investors in equilibrium. Consistently with their
prediction, Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009) find a negative relation between
fees and before-fee performance in the cross section of US equity funds. More-
over, Bergstresser et al. (2009) document little or no benefit from brokers when
investors are charged large distribution fees.
This chapter also extends the literature that relates the conflicting preferences
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of existing investors and mutual fund strategy. More specifically, I argue that,
when choosing their dividend policy, mutual funds need to resolve a conflict be-
tween existing investors with different dividend preferences. Existing investors
have different interests. Johnson (2004) documents that the transaction costs
of investors depend on their investment horizons. Short-term investors transfer
transaction costs to long-term investors. Christoffersen et al. (2005) show that
retirement and nonretirment accounts have different tax preferences. Conse-
quently, mutual funds make trade offs between the two types of accounts.
More related to our topic, differences in dividend preferences across investors
are well documented in the literature (see, for example, Becker et al., 2011;
Graham and Kumar, 2006; Scholz, 1992; Thaler and Shefrin, 1981). One ex-
planation of the existence of dividend clientele is that some investors may use
regular stock dividend income streams to finance consumption (Becker et al.,
2011; Graham and Kumar, 2006). If this argument is true, these investors
prefer not only high dividend assets but also more frequent distributions.
The empirical analysis in this chapter proceeds in two parts. In the main
test, I investigate how dividend policy is related to fund characteristics that
affect the different conflicts of interest. In the second test, I examine how
investors respond to multi-dividend policy. Specifically, I regress net relative
flows on fund characteristics and add interaction terms of fund characteristics
and dummy for multi-dividend policy.
The main results are summarized as follows. First, I find evidence that mutual
funds deliberately choose dividend policy. The dividend policy is persistent
over time, and, to large extent, independent from market characteristics, in
particular of the market average stock dividend ratio. Second, I find that
multi-dividend policy potentially hurts investors. Multi-dividend funds on av-
erage have more stable dividend payout ratios over time and obtain worse raw
returns than single-dividend funds. The results suggest that multi-dividend
funds chase dividends and hold liquid assets. Third, I document that the fre-
quency of dividend payment is positively associated with the dividend ratio,
a variable that affects the conflict of interest between new and existing in-
vestors. I also find that participation costs, proxied by marketing expenses,
are positively related with dividend frequency. Funds are more likely to pay
dividends more frequently in the years when the risk-free interesting rates de-
crease. Finally, I show evidence that funds with higher dividend ratios and
participation costs attract more net flows if they use multi-dividend policy,
other things equal. The investors in multi-dividend funds are less sensitive
to high performance than the ones in single-dividend funds. The results are
consistent with the existence of a dividend clientele, who uses dividends to
finance their consumption.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2.2 covers the relevant
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background. Section 2.3 provides the hypotheses. Section 3.2 describes the
data. Section 2.5 shows the empirical results. Finally, section 3.4 concludes.
.2.2 Background
Mutual funds are categorized as regulated investment companies in the US.
Under the tax rules in subchapter M of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), mu-
tual funds do not pay taxes on their income, i.e., dividend or interest received
from asset under management, or capital gains as long as they fulfill certain
requirements. One requirement on distribution is that a mutual fund should
“pass through” at least 90% of incomes to their shareholders in the US each
taxable year. The mutual fund may retain up to 10% of its incomes and all
capital gains, which are taxed at regulated corporate tax rate. The IRC also
imposes an excise tax, at 4% rate, on mutual funds unless a mutual fund dis-
tributes 98% of its ordinary income during the calendar year before December
31 and 98% of capital gains earned in the 12-month period ending on Octo-
ber 31.4 Therefore, mutual funds usually distribute nearly all dividends and
realized capital gains each year to avoid unnecessary taxes.5
It is worthy to mention that dividend received by mutual funds and dividend
received by fund shareholders are different in terms of quantity. Although mu-
tual funds have to “pass through” dividends to their shareholders, it does not
necessarily follow that shareholders receive all dividends that a mutual fund
receives from its assets. A fund uses dividends received from assets under man-
agement to offset expenses. As a result, the dividend received by shareholders
is the dividend received by the fund from its assets under management net of
the expense. Thus, in rare cases, realized dividend frequency is not equal to
scheduled frequency if the expense a fund charges is higher than the dividend
it is supposed to pass through.
In this chapter, we only focus on the dividend and its policy. Mutual funds
typically generate three types of current of potential cash flow for investors
who do not sell their shares. These are the following: (1) incomes, i.e., divi-
dends payments, including income in the form of dividends and interest on the
securities in its portfolio (minus disclosed expenses)6; (2) realized capital gains,
i.e., appreciation of securities in value, which are already sold minus any cap-
ital losses (it includes short-term realized capital gains and long-term realized
4See Section 852 in Subchapter M of the IRC for more details.
5See the chapter ”Tax Features of Mutual Funds”, Investment Company Fact Book, ICI,
2012, for more details.
6www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/sec-guide-to-mutual-funds.pdf.
10 2. Mutual Fund Dividend Policy
capital gains); (3) unrealized capital gains, i.e., appreciation of a fund’s assets
in value, which are not sold yet by fund managers. The virtue of addressing
mutual fund dividends rather than capital gains (realized or unrealized) is ob-
vious. First, a fund’s dividend yields are highly representative of the fund’s
ex ante dividend policy because dividends are predicable. Meanwhile, a fund’s
capital gains and their realization are highly dependent not only on ex ante
policy but also on other market factors, such as stock prices and fund flows
(Christoffersen et al., 2005). Second, the dividend distribution is observable
for investors from the prospectus and past fund distributions, but unrealized
capital gain is not. Third, dividends have more direct and large impact on
investors than capital gains (for more details, see Barclay et al. (1998) and
section 2.3.2). Fourth, although dividends and realized capital gains have the
same framework and impact on investors, dividend policy is more heteroge-
neous than capital gain policy across funds because mutual funds typically
save realized capital gains until the end of the year because it could be used
to offset capital loss, but not for dividends.
We define dividend policy as the frequency of dividend distributions that a
mutual fund intends to pay out during one year. This definition is similar
to, if any, dividend distribution schedules in their prospectuses. For example,
the Fidelity Equity-Income Fund claims that its dividend distributions are in
April, July, October, and December.7 The scheduled frequency of the Fidelity
Equity-Income Fund is four times per year. It could be seen as the promise
to investors. I verify that a mutual fund should strictly follow the schedule in
its prospectus, if any, to pay dividends. As the consumer service of Fidelity
Investments replies to my request, “within a mutual fund’s composition, cash
is set aside to pay dividends to shareholders of the security. If the fund is
scheduled to pay a distribution on a quarterly basis, it will pay one as long as
enough cash within the fund is available.” There is no reason to suspect that a
fund documents a multi-dividend policy in prospectus and it actually intends
to apply single-dividend policy. It is costly for the fund if such behavior is
found, and investors who purchase this fund because of dividend policy might
flee from the fund when they find the realized dividend policy is not the same
as they expected.
7https://fundresearch.fidelity.com/mutual-funds/fees-and-prices/316138106.
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.2.3 Hypotheses
.2.3.1 Does Multi-Dividend Policy Hurt Investors?
Dividend distribution is not cost-free. When a mutual fund passes dividends
to its shareholders, it incurs transaction fees (e.g., transference costs). Some of
the costs might be fixed for each distribution. Therefore, multi-dividend funds
might need to pay more cost than single-dividend funds. These transaction
fees are ultimately paid by shareholders. As a consequence, one could expect
multi-dividend funds on average charge higher transaction fees than single-
dividend funds. The extra charged fees may erode fund performance.
Hypothesis 1 Multi-dividend funds underperform single-dividend funds, other
things equal.
The costs that multi-dividend policy brings is not always explicit. One im-
portant dimension of hidden costs from multi-dividend policy is tax. Figure
2.1 illustrates the potential cost of investing in a multi-dividend fund resulting
from taxes. We assume two identical funds with different dividend policies
(semiannual and annual). The expected return is zero and the reinvestment
rate is 100%. The funds in both panels have the same expense ratio, 2%, and
receive the same amount of dividends, 1.5%. We assume that the expense is
uniformly charged during the year. Both funds receives $0.015 dividends per
each dollar from stocks in the first half year and $0 in the second half year.
At the beginning of year, an individual invests $1 in each fund in panel A and
panel B. In the middle of the year, the investor receives 0 dividend from fund
A and $0.005 from fund B. The investor holds $0.99 of each fund. At the end
of the year, the investor receives 0 dividend from each fund and holds $0.98
of each fund. The investor pays tax on $0.005 dividends received from fund
B. As a results, the before-tax payoffs are the same for both funds in panel A
and B. Yet, the fund A dominates the fund B since the investor pays taxes on
the dividends that she receives.
The tax cost of multi-dividend policy results from the mismatch between the
period of personal income tax and that of dividend distribution, i.e., personal
income tax is calculated on a yearly basis while the dividends are distributed
on a shorter basis. Therefore, a multi-dividend fund could avoid potential tax
cost caused by dividend policy if the outcomes of dividend payout (e.g., pay
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Figure 2.1: Time line of taxes paid under different assumptions about the dividend
policy of a mutual fund
or not pay) in each period are the same as the outcomes when the fund uses
the single-dividend policy. It implies that the dividend payments are stable
over the time, i.e., a fund keeps paying dividends or not over the time.
There are two ways for multi-dividend funds to stabilize dividend payments.
The first way is to stabilize the dividends that a fund receives from the stocks,
given the fees charged by funds are relatively fixed. It is not difficult to predict
how many and when a stock is going to pay dividends from its characteristics
and past dividend history (Fama and French, 2001; Hartzmark and Solomon,
2013). The funds, therefore, could make the corresponding adjustments on
their holdings and generate the amount of dividends they wish. Harris et al.
(2012) provide evidence that some mutual funds change their holdings be-
fore dividend payment (ex-day). The dividend stability also stems from the
pressure of investors. In section 2.3.3, we argue that individuals invest in
multi-dividend funds for the purpose of obtaining constant and stable divi-
dend flows. If a multi-dividend fund targets these investors, it should keep net
dividend stable in terms of quantity in each dividend period or the investors
would flee away for it. However, single-dividend funds are not attractive for
these investors, and consequently, do not have any incentive to stabilize the
dividend because it is costly.
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A mutual fund can also keep dividend payment stable through setting its ex-
pense ratio. For example, a fund could set a low expense ratio if it hopes
to pay dividends to investors. As such, a multi-dividend fund could charge
low fees, including waive or reimburse fees, to generate more available divi-
dends passing through to its shareholders if the fund could expect the future
dividends would be stable and low. This operation actually benefits the in-
vestors. Meanwhile, a fund has no incentive to charge high fees while it uses
multi-dividend policy.
Hypothesis 2A Multi-dividend funds have more stable dividend ratios than
single-dividend funds, other things being equal.
Hypothesis 2B The dividend frequency is negatively related to expense ratio,
other things being equal.
.2.3.2 Conflict between Existing and New Investors
Figure 2.2 illustrates that existing and new investors might have different
preferences on dividend policy. Assume that two identical funds, X and Y,
have different dividend policies (annual and semiannual). We assume that the
expected return is 0, the total net asset (TNA) is $100, and the reinvestment
rate is 100%. Both funds only have one shareholder A. Funds receive $10
dollars as dividend at the beginning of the year and no other dividends in the
rest of year. X would pay out the dividends at the end of the year, and Y
would pay out in the middle of the year. A new investor B invests $20 dollars
into both funds (the relative flow is 20%) after Y pays out the dividends.
Investors A and B would have the same payoffs from fund A and B, other
things being equal. However, investor B has to pay the taxes for the dividends
received from fund X. Table 2.1 shows the payoffs of both investors from X
and Y from two funds. For existing investor A, fund X, which uses single-
dividend policy, is better than multi-dividend fund Y. On the other hand, new
investor B would find multi-dividend fund Y is more favorable. It shows that
the dividend policy most attractive to new investors may be costly for existing
investors. Hence, compared with single-dividend policy, multi-dividend policy
might attract new investors and, consequently, increase mutual fund’s inflows.
Yet, multi-dividend policy also brings potential costs to existing investors. A
mutual fund needs to trade off interest between existing and new investors to
maximize its size.
Mutual funds pay distributions (e.g., dividends) following the equal allocation
rule, i.e., each share would receive the same amount of dividends. Investors
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Figure 2.2: The Impact of Dividend Policy on After-tax Returns
Table 2.1: Payout of Exiting and New Investors
Investor Fund Dividend Tax Returns
A X $8.33 $2.75 -2.75%
Y $10 $3.3 -3.3%
B X $1.67 $0.55 -2.75%
Y $0 $0 0
as of a distribution date would share dividends according to the proportion
of shares they hold in the whole portfolio, regardless of their purchase date
or whether their shares appreciate or not. That is to say, a new investor
would share the undistributed dividends accumulated from the nearest divi-
dend distribution to purchase time with existing investors. It follows that a
new investor would receive more dividends in the current year and pay un-
necessary income taxes. The investor would try to avoid funds with a high
overhang of undistributed dividends. This argument is in spirit to that of
Bergstresser and Poterba (2002). They find a fund with heavy-taxed returns
(e.g., undistributed dividends), receives lower inflows than funds offering sim-
ilar pretax returns but lower tax burdens. Johnson and Poterba (2010) show
that retail investors time their purchase of mutual fund to avoid tax acceler-
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ation with distributions. If more frequent dividend distributions could lower
the tax burdens of new investors, mutual funds would have incentive to pass
through dividends to relieve dividend overhang as soon as possible, such as
using multi-dividend policy.
The equal allocation rule also causes unrealized capital gain overhang (UCGO)
(Barclay et al., 1998; Bergstresser and Poterba, 2002). Dividend overhang
(DO) in this chapter is different from UCGO in two aspects. First, DO affects
new investors by transferring capital gain taxes in the future to dividend in-
come taxes at the current year, or vice versa for existing investors. Because tax
rates for capital gains and dividend income are different, DO changes tax bur-
dens not only in time but also in quantity. Yet UCGO only retimes the capital
gains tax liability of investors, if any, but not tax quantity (Bergstresser et al.,
2003). As such, some short-term investors may not be affected by UCGO but
by DO. Second, DO can have a larger impact on low-income investors. If an
investor’ income tax rate is 10% or 15%, his or her capital gain rate is 0%. As
a result, the investor needs to pay the taxes on dividend income but not on
long-term capital gains.
The dividend overhang problem would exist in a fund unless a fund pays
out undistributed dividends every day. Figure 2.3 intuitively shows when a
mutual fund receives dividends and when it distributes them. Panel A shows
how the S&P 500 dividend index evolves from January, 2009 to December,
20118. Panel B illustrates the frequency of dividend distribution each month
during the same period. It is easy to observe that a mutual fund typically
pays out dividends at the end of year/quarter, but it receives dividends all the
time.
Assume a fund receives dS from the underlying assets it holds, where d is
the dividends received for each dollar in the portfolio and S is the total net
assets of the portfolio held by existing investors in dollar. We assume the
expense ratio is 0. Thus, the fund would pay dS of dividends. Just before the
distribution, a new investor buys s dollars of this fund. As a consequence, the
new investor would receive dSS+s per dollar as dividends. At the end of the year,
the investor needs to pay dSS+s td as income tax for each dollar invested, where
td is the income tax rate. If the dividend ratio dSS+s is, for example, 1% and the
income tax rate td is 33%, the new investor loses 0.33% of the principal. This
number increases with the dividend ratio. So the potential tax cost for the
new investors is positively related to dividend ratio. As a result, new investors
might avoid buying funds with high dividend ratios. Consequently, those funds
8The S&P 500 dividend index measures the total dividends paid in the underlying index
since the previous rebalancing date. The index resets to zero on a quarterly basis. The
data is downloadable at S & P index website.
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Figure 2.3: S&P 500 Dividend Index and Dividend Distributions
Panel A of this figure illustrates how S&P 500 dividend index evolves from 2009 to 2011.
Panel B shows the monthly frequency of dividend distributions from 2009 to 2011. S&P 500
dividend index measures the total dividends paid in the underlying index since the previous
rebalancing date. The index resets to zero on a quarterly basis. The monthly dividend
distribution frequency is calculated as the times of dividend distributions during one month
over the total times during the year.
have incentives to pay dividends more frequently (e.g., multi-dividend policy)
to attract new investors.
Because of the equal allocation rule, existing investors receive the same amount
of dividends as new investors, dSS+s per dollar, and pay the corresponding
income tax. In another scenario without new investors, existing investors
would receive d per dollar. The difference of the dividends received by existing
investors in two scenarios is d− dSS+s = dsS+s . Existing investors always receive
less dividends in the scenario with the existence of new investors. Therefore,
existing investors would prefer a fund with larger dividend ratios to use single-
dividend policy so that more new investors could share the dividends. They
would prefer the single-dividend funds since they could receive more dividends
from multi-dividend funds than from single-dividend funds, other things being
equal.
Yet, it is worthy to note that existing investors are less affected by dividend
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policy than new investors. With the aforementioned notations, the difference
of taxes an existing investor would pay is dsS+s td per dollar in the current
year, whereas the difference for a new investor between two scenarios is dSS+s td.
Therefore, a new investor incurs more unnecessary costs for choosing wrong
dividend policy than existing investors in the current year ( dsS+s < dSS+s ) when
the relative flows are not too huge ( sS < 1)9. Moreover, existing investors
still need to pay capital gain taxes on the dividends shared by new investors.
They swap income taxes in the current year for capital gain taxes in the future
in the scenario with new investors. When they sell the funds in the future,
they have to pay dsS+s tcp per dollar as capital gain tax. Therefore, without
considering money’s time value, the difference of taxes for existing investors
between two scenarios turns to dtd − dSS+s td − dsS+s tcp, or dsS+s (td − tcp), where
tcp is the capital gain tax rate and td > tcp. This result suggests that dividend
policy has much smaller impact on existing investors than on new investors,
and therefore, exiting investors are less sensitive to the dividend policy than
new investors. Funds might benefit from multi-dividend policy by attracting
new investors and not losing too many existing investors.
Hypothesis 3 Mutli-dividend policy is positively associated with dividend ra-
tio ( dSS+s), controlling for other characteristics.
Some investors in the market may seek regular income streams. They might
buy fixed-income assets, i.e., money or bond market funds, bank accounts, and
short-term paper, since they distribute dividends more frequently and stably.
However, it does not favor mutual fund management companies’ interest. The
expenses charged by equity funds are much higher than that by fixed-income
assets, such as bond funds. Therefore, fund management companies might
encourage money flows from fixed-income assets to equity funds.
One way to attract money from fixed-income assets is through divided policy.
As Fidelity Investments posts in its website, “with today’s rates already very
low, bond market return dynamics may look different moving forward, and
these changes may help to make dividends (of equity funds) look attractive.”10
Some investors even might equal multi-dividend equity funds to fixed-income
assets without considering their risks are different11.
Equity funds face two competitions for intriguing investors from fixed-income
assets. The first competition is between equity funds and fixed-income assets.
9In my sample, more than 96% observations have relative flows smaller than 1.
10https://www.fidelity.com/learning-center/trading/all-about-dividends/new-era-for-
dividends
11For example, CNN reports that some investors might mis-
take multi-dividend funds as fixed-income portfolios. See
http://money.cnn.com/2011/11/03/pf/expert/bond_funds/index.htm
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In equilibrium, equity funds might increase dividend frequency when fixed-
income assets are more attractive, i.e., yields on fixed-income assets are higher,
and vice versa. The second competition is within the equity funds. When
yields on fixed-income assets are lower, money flows from fixed-income assets
to equity funds. As such, an equity fund needs to compete with other equity
funds by increasing the dividend frequency. However, the domination of these
two competitions is still unclear.
We use risk-free interest rate to proxy for the return of fixed-income assets.
Admittedly, the return on fixed-income assets is plausibly associated with the
corporate dividend payment and, subsequently, affects the dividends received
by mutual funds. In this chapter, we do not consider it is important because
(1) the impact of corporate dividend payment is the same for multi-dividend
and single-dividend funds and (2) the impact of interest rate on corporate
dividend payment is indirect whereas that on fixed income asset returns is
direct.
Hypothesis 4 Mutual funds are more likely to pay dividends more frequently
when the return of fixed-income assets is higher, controlling for other fund
characteristics.
.2.3.3 Conflict within Existing Investors
Existing investors of mutual funds have different interests. Mutual funds trade
off interest within existing investors in order to maximize their size and, there-
fore, revenue (Christoffersen et al., 2005). Similarly, there are reasons to
believe that existing investors have different preferences in dividend policy.
Previous studies (Becker et al., 2011; Graham and Kumar, 2006; Scholz, 1992;
Thaler and Shefrin, 1981) well document the existence of dividend clientele.
These authors propose that some investors might prefer high dividend stocks
for consumption or tax purposes.
Previous empirical studies based on dividends do not distinguish between con-
sumption and tax rationale. The investors who have more pronounced needs
to finance their consumption typically have lower tax rates. Mutual fund div-
idend policy provides a unique opportunity to test the purpose of investment
from dividend clientele. Because of the pass-through regulation, the sum of
the dividends for a year would be similar for most funds with small relative
flows (see discussion in the previous section). Therefore, if the demand for
dividends stems from that some investors have a relative low tax rates, they
would not show preference to multi-dividend funds because their tax burdens
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would be almost the same. Contrary to tax rationale, under the assumption
that an investor uses dividends to finance his or her consumption, he or she
would prefer regular income streams, as in multi-dividend funds, because of
self-control (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981). The following argument in this section
is under the consumption rationale.
If the purpose of investing in a mutual fund is to gain regular income streams,
investors can realize this purpose via two ways related to equity funds: holding
multi-dividend funds and partially selling single-dividend funds. Under the as-
sumptions of Miller and Modigliani (1961), the dividend policy is irrelevant to
investors’ choices in the absence of transaction costs since they could generate
regular dividend streams by themselves. Investors could always cancel out a
firm’s dividend policy by realizing “homemade dividends”, i.e., partly selling
shares. However, redeeming shares could be expensive. One type of cost is
related to the information cost. To redeem shares, they probably want to fore-
cast the future returns of the funds and choose the time to sell the funds. As
such, investors need to actively or passively collect and analyze information.
They might even regret after they sell the funds if they made the wrong de-
cisions. Another type of cost is related to transaction cost. Investors need to
pay, if any, front/back-end loads, brokerage fees, when they sell and reinvest
the funds. There is also the opportunity cost of time spent trading shares.
Following Huang et al. (2007), I term those costs participation costs. As such,
investors who are seeking for regular income streams might avoid investing
in funds with high participation costs if they use a single-dividend policy. In
equilibrium, a multi-dividend fund is more likely to have participation costs
than a single-dividend fund if they both target dividend clientele. Admittedly,
some single-dividend funds may not target dividend clientele. Therefore, their
investors are more likely to pose obtaining better fund performance as the
primary goal of investing funds and, consequently, be performance-sensitive.
They buy and sell funds more frequently. As such, those investors would
avoid single-dividend funds with high participation costs. As a result, a multi-
dividend fund has higher participation costs than a single-dividend fund.
Hypothesis 5 Dividend frequency is positively associated with participation
costs.
.2.4 Data
I obtain data from the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free Mutual Fund Database span-
ning from 2000 to 2011. The original sample contains all open-end mutual
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funds that are active from 2000 to 2011. From the initial sample, I retain
domestic equity mutual funds defined by the lipper objective codes.12 I also
exclude index and institutional funds identified by CRSP identifiers, i.e., in-
dex_fund_flag and inst_fund. I identify funds with multiple share classes by
crsp_cl_grp provided by CRSP and compute the fund characteristics as the
asset-weighted means of class characteristics. In some rare cases, the dividend
payment varies across classes even in the same fund. It stems from that classes
in the same portfolios have different fee structures. For example, assume one
portfolio has two classes with expense ratios 1.55% and 1.50%, respectively.
The dividend ratio before fee is 1.52%. As a consequence, one class in this
portfolio pays dividends whereas the other class does not. I define a fund pays
a dividend payment if any class in its portfolio pays. Following Elton et al.
(2011) and Evans (2010), I drop the smallest funds, i.e., total net assets below
$15 million, and the young funds, i.e., the age is less than 36 months. This
leaves a sample of 3,257 distinguish funds and 18,574 fund-year observations.
I am interested in examining how a mutual fund determines the frequency of
dividend distributions that the fund intends to pay out. As such, I estimate
dividend policy as the realized frequency of dividend distributions during a
calendar year plus one if a fund does not pay dividends in December and zero
otherwise. There are two considerations for the definition. First, we use re-
alized dividend frequency, rather than scheduled dividend policy, to calculate
dividend policy. Empirically, realized dividend frequency is typically consis-
tent with intended dividend frequency. In some rare cases, a fund does not
pay dividends to its shareholders if the fund does not collect enough dividends
to offset fees. However, funds can easily avoid this situation. A mutual fund
can simply buy stocks before the dividend distribution date to collect enough
dividends (Harris et al., 2012). As such, realized dividend frequency is repre-
sentative of mutual fund intention. Another reason is that the real dividend
policy that a fund intends to use is difficult to observe. Not all funds report
scheduled dividend frequency in the prospectus and funds might change their
intentions over time. Second, a mutual fund can choose fiscal or calendar year
as its taxable year.13 However, excise tax rule suggests that all mutual funds
need to distribute, if any, dividends at the end of December. Therefore, we
assume that all mutual funds intend to apply this rule, i.e., they all plan to pay
dividends in December, even if it ends up that they do not pay any dividend
in December. Empirical results support this assumption. In my sample, more
than 98% mutual funds that have one dividend distribution choose to pay it
in December. I use the realized frequency of dividend distributions and the
12We consider the fund is a domestic equity fund when the fund is classified as one of the
following categories by lipper_class: LCVE, MLVE, EI, EIEI, LCCE, MLCE, LCGE,
MLGE, MCVE, MCCE, MCGE, SCVE, SCCE, and SCGE.
13http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-%26-Self-Employed/Tax-Years
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expected dividend frequency, i.e., the maximal dividend frequency over the
past three years. The results are robust.
Table 2.2 provides the summary statistics for our sample. All definitions of the
variables of fund characteristics are similar to previous literature. My main
variables are dividend frequency and dividend ratio. Some mutual funds pay
dividends14 several times in the same month or in the same day, typically when
dividends belong to different types (e.g., income dividend and qualified income
dividend). Therefore, I consider dividend distributions in the same month as
one time. I calculate dividend frequency as the numbers of months when a
mutual fund pays dividends (from 0 to 12). I define multi-dividend dummy
equals to 1 if dividend frequency is larger than one time, and zero otherwise.
The yearly dividend ratio is calculated as the sum of dividend ratios, defined as
the distribution amount over reinvestment price, for each dividend distribution
throughout the year.
In panel A of table 2.2, I report the summary statistics for all funds in the
sample. Among those funds that at least pay dividend once in the year, nearly
30% are multi-dividend funds. Funds, on average, pay dividends 1.7 times per
year. Panel B provides the mean and the standard deviation of variables of in-
terest for funds paying dividends one, two, three or four times and larger than
four times: 70.4% fund-years use single-dividend policy and pay dividend once
per year. 14.93% and 12.64% fund-years pay dividends twice and three or four
times per year, respectively; and 2% fund-years pay dividends more than four
times. In panel B, apart from the observations with dividend frequency equal
to 1, dividend ratio, load, and risk-free interest rate increase with dividend
frequency whereas the past 12-month raw return is negatively associated to
dividend frequency, suggestive of our hypotheses. The univariate relationship
between variables of interest and dividend policy fits our hypotheses across all
dividend frequencies. In the robustness test (unreported), I drop the obser-
vations that there is no dividend payment during the year to avoid suspicious
missing observations. The results are mainly the same.
Since mutual fund segments have their own objectives, they might have the
corresponding dividend policies across segments. To offer a broader view of the
database, Table 2.3 reports the summary statistics relating to fund segments.
Panel A reports the summary statistics of dividend frequency and dividend
ratio in each segment. The first observation is that mutual fund dividend
policy varies across mutual fund segments. Consistent with my expectation,
dividend frequency is highly associated with dividend ratio. Income, large-
cap funds, which have large dividend ratios, pay dividend distributions more
frequently. Growth and small-cap funds are more likely to use single-dividend
14I identify dividend distributions as mutual fund dividends if the first letter of dis_type in
CRSP is “D”.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics for our database sample. Panel A provides the
summary statistics for variables of interests. Panel B reports the summary statistics across
the dividend frequency. DivRatio is the sum of the dividend ratio, defined as distribu-
tion amount over reinvestment price, for each dividend distribution during the whole year.
LnDivRatio is the natural logarithm of the dividend ratio plus 1. DivFreq is the number
of months when a fund pays dividends. MultiDiv is the dummy variable that equals 1 if
DivFreq is larger than 1, and 0 if DivFreq is equal to 1. LnSize is the nature logarithm of
total net asset under fund management. LnAge is the nature logarithm of age in months.
FrontLoads is the front load. BackLoad is the back load for holding 48 months. ExpRatio
is the expense ratio defined as total operating expenses divided by the year-end total net
assets. TurnRatio is the turnover ratio. FundRet is the raw return for the past 12 months
(buy and hold). Size is the total net asset under fund management. RF is the risk-free
interest rates, defined as the one-month Treasury bill rate at the end of the year.
PANEL A: Summary Statistics for variables of interests
Mean SD Median 1st perc. 99th perc. N
DivRatio (%) 0.498 1.084 0.026 0.000 3.666 18574
LnDivRatio (%) 0.492 1.022 0.026 0.000 3.601 18574
DivFreq (times) 1.690 1.560 1 1 12 18574
MultiDiv 0.296 0.457 0 0 1 18574
LnSize ($ million) 5.856 1.613 5.752 2.918 9.997 18090
LnAge (month) 4.946 0.658 4.875 3.871 6.758 18574
FrontLoad (%) 1.766 2.118 0.000 0.000 5.750 18217
BackLoad 0.116 0.276 0.000 0.000 1.272 18217
ExpRatio (%) 1.321 0.430 1.315 0.203 2.413 16213
TurnRatio (%) 85.049 87.257 64 3 401 16097
Fundret (%) 4.382 20.849 7.427 -45.024 46.689 14826
PANEL B: Summary Statistics across Dividend Frequency
DivFreq All
1 2 3 or 4 ≥5
N 13073 2773 2348 380 18574
DivRatio 0.250 0.985 1.096 1.801 0.498
(% per year) (0.612) (1.563) (2.78) (2.822) (1.084)
LnSize 5.727 6.046 6.364 5.741 5.856
($ million ) (1.565) (1.631) (1.762) (1.354) (1.613)
LnAge 4.904 4.982 5.139 4.909 4.946
(0.633) (0.646) (0.761) (0.668) (0.658)
FrontLoad 1.839 0.902 2.189 2.829 1.766
(%) (2.102) (1.781) (2.276) (2.067) (2.118)
BackLoad 0.131 0.0399 0.112 0.175 0.116
(%) (0.292) (0.158) (0.263) (0.311) (0.276)
ExpRatio 1.398 1.056 1.220 1.272 1.321
(% per year) (0.417) (0.423) (0.370) (0.341) (0.430)
FundRet 4.307 5.289 4.200 2.475 106.550
(% per year) (21.895) (18.049) (18.370) (17.929) (19.86846)
Rf 0.158 0.106 0.171 0.179 0.152
(% per year) (0.151) (0.144) (0.156) (0.150) (0.152)
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics for Segments
Panel A summarizes dividend frequency across segments in the sample. Panel B provides
the proportion of each segment in the sample over years. EIEI is equity income funds.
LCVE is large-cap value funds. LCCE is large-cap core funds. MLVE is multi-cap value
funds. MLCE is multi-cap core funds. MCVE is mid-cap value funds. MCCE is mid-cap
core funds. SCVE is small-cap value funds. LCGE is large-cap growth funds. SCCE is
small-cap core funds. MLGE is multi-cap growth funds. MCGE is mid-cap growth funds.
SCGE is small-cap growth funds. DivFreq is the dividend frequency defined as frequency
of dividend distribution during one year. DivRatio is the dividend ratio defined as sum of
dividend distribution amount over the reinvestment price reported by funds during one year.
PANEL A: Dividend Frequency across Segments
Lipper Code Class Name DivFreq DivRatio (%) Obs.
Mean 10% Median 90%
EIEI Equity Income Funds 5.021 1 4 12 1.884 746
LCVE Large-Cap Value Funds 2.486 1 2 4 1.066 1226
LCCE Large-Cap Core Funds 2.132 1 1 4 0.741 2702
MLVE Multi-Cap Value Funds 2.119 1 1 4 0.840 1201
MLCE Multi-Cap Core Funds 1.579 1 1 3 0.656 2118
MCVE Mid-Cap Value Funds 1.543 1 1 3 0.475 678
MCCE Mid-Cap Core Funds 1.449 1 1 2 0.384 980
SCVE Small-Cap Value Funds 1.337 1 1 2 0.391 861
SCCE Small-Cap Core Funds 1.270 1 1 2 0.271 1713
LCGE Large-Cap Growth Funds 1.253 1 1 2 0.153 2163
MLGE Multi-Cap Growth Funds 1.106 1 1 2 0.010 1311
MCGE Mid-Cap Growth Funds 1.051 1 1 1 0.037 1432
SCGE Small-Cap Growth Funds 1.029 1 1 1 0.040 1443
Panel B: Percentage of Mutual Fund Types over Years (%)
Lipper Code Year
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EIEI 5.274% 4.991% 4.208% 3.743% 3.331% 3.421% 3.141% 3.641% 3.979% 4.350% 4.180% 4.268%
LCCE 10.348% 13.047% 16.172% 18.182% 17.071% 15.359% 14.071% 12.549% 12.268% 13.712% 15.049% 15.619%
LCGE 10.846% 14.711% 12.954% 10.466% 10.132% 9.926% 10.537% 10.013% 11.207% 13.191% 12.912% 12.054%
LCVE 9.652% 6.042% 6.271% 5.882% 5.413% 5.701% 6.283% 6.307% 7.692% 6.761% 6.456% 7.176%
MCCE 3.184% 3.590% 3.960% 4.966% 6.107% 6.170% 5.497% 5.657% 5.172% 5.768% 6.224% 5.113%
MCGE 6.667% 7.968% 8.333% 8.403% 7.981% 8.317% 8.246% 8.323% 7.958% 7.612% 6.921% 6.567%
MCVE 5.672% 4.116% 3.795% 3.361% 3.331% 3.957% 4.450% 4.226% 4.178% 3.168% 2.183% 3.143%
MLCE 8.060% 6.743% 7.838% 9.626% 11.520% 12.072% 12.042% 13.199% 11.804% 12.199% 13.423% 13.180%
MLGE 11.841% 8.319% 5.776% 5.653% 6.801% 6.908% 6.283% 7.412% 7.095% 6.478% 6.595% 7.317%
MLVE 11.045% 11.384% 9.158% 8.327% 6.870% 6.707% 7.003% 5.722% 4.973% 4.303% 4.134% 4.268%
SCCE 4.279% 5.079% 6.353% 8.480% 9.160% 9.457% 9.817% 10.533% 10.809% 10.260% 11.426% 9.991%
SCGE 5.771% 7.706% 8.168% 7.945% 8.536% 8.250% 8.312% 8.062% 8.157% 8.038% 7.106% 7.083%
SCVE 7.363% 6.305% 7.013% 4.966% 3.747% 3.756% 4.319% 4.356% 4.708% 4.161% 3.391% 4.221%
policy. However, the relationship between dividend frequency and dividend
ratio is not perfect. For example, although the funds in segment “MLVE”
have larger dividend ratios than the ones in segment “LCCE”, the average
of dividend ratio in the former segment is smaller than that in the latter
segment. The second observation is that the dividend policy varies across
mutual funds within the same segment. Even in the segment with the lowest
dividend ratio, there are some funds pay dividends more frequently than the
mandated time. Panel B provides the percentage of mutual fund segments
changes over time. The largest five segments in terms of percentage in 2011 are
“LCCE”, “MLCE”, “LCGE”, “SCCE” and “LMGE”. They represent segments
with different dividend policies.
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.2.5 Empirical Strategy and Results
.2.5.1 Dividend Distribution Frequency as Strategic Choice
I begin my empirical test by examining whether mutual funds consider divi-
dend distribution frequency as a strategic choice. Under this hypothesis, we
should expect that a mutual fund’s dividend distribution frequency would de-
pend on its strategy rather than market characteristics (e.g., market dividend
yields). The first prediction is that mutual funds’ dividend policy is persistent
from year to year. If a fund chooses its dividend policy randomly, the frequency
of dividend distributions would vary over years. Many mutual funds report
their dividend distribution schedules in their prospectuses. This promise, if
any, to a large extent, ensures the persistence of dividend policy. To for-
mally examine the persistence of dividend policy, following the methodology
in Carhart (1997) and Berk and Tonks (2007), I count the numbers of funds
that keep (change) their dividend policy from year t to year t+1, as well as
from year t to year t+2. Table 2.4 reports the results. The results show that
91% of mutual funds have persistent dividend policy in the next year and 90%
of funds’ dividend policy remains persistent in the year t+2.
Table 2.4: Persistence of Dividend Frequency
This table reports the number of the funds using different dividend policies. Multi-dividend
implies a fund uses multi-dividend policy. Single-dividend implies a fund uses single-dividend
policy.
Year t Year t+1 Year t+2
Multi-dividend Single-dividend Multi-dividend Single-dividend
Multi-dividend 3904 550 2922 549
Single-dividend 566 10297 574 8364
Another prediction is that the frequency of dividend distributions is, to some
extent, independent from the market characteristics. Figure 2.4 illustrates
that the market average frequency of dividend distribution is irrelevant to the
stock market dividend payout. It shows how the average mutual fund div-
idend frequency, the dividend ratio, and the S&P 500 dividend yield evolve
over time. S&P 500 dividend yield (blue line) increases from 2000 to 2011
with a peak in 2008. The dividend ratio (bottom line) has a shape similar to
S&P 500 dividend yield, but smoother. If a mutual fund does not manipu-
late the dividend distribution frequency, the mutual fund average frequency
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and the market dividend yield are supposed to follow the same distribution
and increase. However, to the contrary, the average frequency of dividend
distribution (top line) gradually decreases from 2000 to 2011. However, this
result might be driven by the decrease of the percentage of segments with high
dividend distribution frequencies in the market.
Figure 2.4: Dividend Policy over Time
The figure illustrates how average mutual fund dividend frequency, dividend ratio, and S&P
500 dividend yield evolve over time. Middle line is the dividend payout of stocks in S&P
500 index. Bottom line is average fund dividend ratio, defined as the cross-sectional mean of
dividend ratio. Top line is the average fund dividend frequency, defined as the cross-sectional
mean of dividend frequency.
To further examine this prediction, I consider the only possible scenario that a
mutual fund does not follow the schedule to pay dividends: when a mutual fund
does not collect enough net dividend, defined as dividends received subtract
fees, it would pay nothing to its shareholders in the scheduled dates. Therefore,
the mutual fund has a lower dividend frequency than scheduled. It is supposed
to be common in the market if a mutual fund does not have any dividend
preference. A typical expense ratio for a mutual fund is 1.5%, and the S&P
500 dividend yields range from 1.1% to 3% in the period from 2000 to 2011.15
In my sample, 27.66% of the fund-year’s expense ratio is higher than the
S&P 500 dividend yield. Therefore, the percentage of the fund-year, which
pays dividend distributions less frequently than the scheduled, proxied by the
maximum distribution frequency in the past three years (from t-2 to t), would
be around this number. However, this number is only 6.85%. This large
15Source: Shiller (2006), www.irrationalexuberance.com
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difference implies that mutual funds do not choose dividend policy randomly.
They deliberately choose dividend policy and keep it persistent.
.2.5.2 Dividend Policy and Fund Characteristics
In this section, we examine the hypotheses in section 2.2, i.e., how a mutual
fund determines its dividend policy. I model multi-dividend policy as a func-
tion of fund characteristics, which are associated with how mutual funds resolve
the conflicts of interest between existing and new investors as well as within
existing investors. Table 2.5 reports the results of our multivariate regressions.
Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) present the results for the logit regressions of
the dummy for multi-dividend policy on fund characteristics. The dependent
variable is Multidiv, which equals 1 if a fund pays dividends more than one
time during one year and 0 if a fund only pays dividend once. The first, the
second, and the third rows for every variable correspond the coefficient, the
marginal effect, and the test statistics (Z-statistics). Columns (2), (4), (6) and
(8) report the coefficients and t-statistics for the pooled OLS regressions of
the dividend frequency in the current year on fund characteristics. Standard
errors in all columns are clustered by fund and year. Regressions in the first
four columns include year and segment fixed effects. The other two regressions
include segment fixed effects.
We start with examining whether multi-dividend policy potentially hurts in-
vestors. The coefficients of FundRet is negative in columns (1), (2), (7) and
(8), although not significant in columns (2) and (8), implying multi-dividend
policy is associated with worse raw returns. Meanwhile, the coefficients on
FundRetRA are insignificant in columns (3) and (4) suggesting risk-adjusted
returns are not different across dividend policy. The results provide very
limited evidence supporting Hypothesis 1. The transaction costs caused by
dividend policy might be marginal to the performance. One possible expla-
nation of the association between raw returns and dividend policy is that
multi-dividend funds may continuously keep a large proportion of low-return
assets (e.g., cash) in their portfolios and therefore get a low raw returns. The
dividends can only be paid in the form of cash. Funds need to keep larger pro-
portion of cash in the portfolio before each distribution. As such, the portfolio
in multi-dividend funds on average are more liquid than that in single-dividend
funds.
To investigate whether multi-dividend policy leads to a more stable dividend
income as suggested by Hypothesis 3, I construct a new variable Stability
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Table 2.5: Fund Characteristics and Dividend Policy
This table reports the regressions of dividend policy on fund characteristics. Columns (1),
(3), (5) and (7) report the coefficients, marginal effects, and associated z-values from logit
regressions for the probability of a fund using the multi-dividend policy. The first, second,
and third rows of each variable reports coefficients, marginal effects and z-statistics, respec-
tively. The dependent variables are dummy variables equal to 1 if a fund uses multi-dividend
policy. Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) report the coefficients and t-statistics from OLS re-
gressions of dividend frequency on fund characteristics. Stability is the natural logarithm
of the absolute value of the ratio of the difference between dividend ratio at t and dividend
ratio at t-1 to dividend ratio at t-1 plus 1, defined in equation 2.1. FundRisk is the standard
deviation of raw returns during one year. FundRetRA is the average monthly risk-adjusted
alpha during the year. All other variables are defined in Table 2.2. Year FE and Segment
FE shows whether we include year and segment fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
by fund and year. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level
and * indicates significance at 10% level.
Dividend Policy
LOGIT OLS LOGIT OLS LOGIT OLS LOGIT OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LnDivratioi,t 35.370*** 37.959*** 40.197** 33.384*** 27.896*** 34.256*** 36.036*** 38.005***
8.489 9.775 6.706 8.649
(3.33) (4.72) (2.45) (2.88) (2.9) (4.75) (3.44) (4.70)
Stabilityi,t 0.452*** 0.473*** 0.553*** 0.460*** 0.446*** 0.470*** 0.443*** 0.464***
0.109 0.134 0.107 0.106
(4.98) (7.39) (5.21) (6.67) (4.99) (7.35) (4.87) (7.26)
ExpRatioi,t -0.280 0.049
-0.067
(-1.08) (0.31)
No12-1Bi,t -0.424 -0.017 -0.460 -0.122 -0.470* -0.049
-0.102 -0.112 -0.113
(-1.59) (-0.09) (-1.49) (-0.56) (-1.83) (-0.27)
PartCosti,t 0.254** 0.503*** 0.277** 0.472*** 0.183* 0.450***
0.061 0.067 0.044
(2.15) (4.05) (2.35) (3.92) (1.69) (3.94)
FundReti,t -0.010** -0.004 -8.993* -7.670* -0.011** -7.670
-0.003 -2.162 -0.003
(-2.00) (-1.28) (-1.90) (-1.65) (-2.08) (-1.43)
FundRetRAi,t -0.010 -0.002
-0.002
(-1.17) (-0.53)
RFt -0.006** -0.003
-0.002
(-2.43) (-1.03)
FrontLoadi,t 0.086** 0.148***
0.021
(2.41) (4.00)
BackLoadi,t -0.040 0.365 -0.103 0.357 0.192 0.577** 0.153 0.528**
-0.010 -0.025 0.046 0.037
(-0.15) (1.42) (-0.33) (1.09) (0.66) (2.09) (0.57) (2.04)
RelFlowi,t -0.127** -0.011* -0.064 -0.021 -0.110* -0.012** -0.130** -0.011*
-0.030 -0.016 -0.026 -0.031
(-2.02) (-1.9) (-1.04) (-0.89) (-1.78) (-2.08) (-2.00) (-1.91)
LnSizei,t 0.000 -0.054 0.013 -0.056 0.014 -0.043 0.007 -0.051
0.000 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.00) (-1.48) (0.28) (-1.51) (0.34) (-1.22) (0.16) (-1.41)
TurnRatiot 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.07) (-0.33) (1.34) (0.46) (1.42) (0.13) (0.94) (-0.41)
LnAgei,t 0.307** 0.128 0.346** 0.178* -0.066 -0.122 0.262** 0.093
0.074 0.084 -0.016 0.063
(2.95) (1.35) (2.84) (1.89) (-0.09) (-0.21) (2.43) (0.97)
FundRiski,t -6.948 -0.848 -6.772 -6.185 0.293*** 0.120 -6.946 -0.990
-1.668 -1.647 0.070 -1.667
(-1.07) (-0.13) (-0.92) (-1.29) (2.82) (1.23) (-1.07) (-0.16)
YEAR FE Y Y Y Y N N Y Y
SEGMENT FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 5345 5345 3922 3922 5345 3922 5345 5345
Pseudo R-sq or R-sq 0.152 0.283 0.151 0.278 0.140 0.275 0.151 0.283
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defined as follows:
Stabilityi,t = −ln(1 + |
Dividend Ratioi,t −Dividend Ratioi,t−1
Dividend Ratioi,t−1
|) (2.1)
Where Dividend Ratio is the sum of the dividend ratio, defined as distribu-
tion amount over reinvestment price, for each dividend distribution during the
whole year. Stability is 0 when the dividend ratio in year t is the same as
the dividend ratio in year t-1, and smaller when the difference between two
variables, either positive or negative, is larger. Therefore, Stability is positively
associated with dividend ratio stability. A mutual fund having more stable div-
idend ratios would get a higher value in Stability. The coefficients of Stability
are positive and significant in columns (1) to (8). The results imply that div-
idend ratio stability is negatively associated with multi-dividend dummy and
dividend frequency. It is consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 2A.
In Hypothesis 2B, I predict that multi-dividend funds have lower expense ratio.
Contrary to this prediction, the coefficients on ExpRatio are insignificant in
columns (7) and (8), suggesting that expense ratio is not statistically different
across dividend policy. Multi-dividend funds do not lower the expense ratio,
a way that benefits investors, to collect sufficient dividend income.
We now turn our attention to another question: Do mutual funds trade off the
interest between existing and new investors to attract new money? As denoted
is section 3.2, in the segments with higher average dividend ratios, funds tend
to pay dividends more frequently. Multivariate analysis also provides strong
evidence at the fund level: the coefficients on LnDivratio are positive and sig-
nificant in all columns. This shows that multi-dividend dummy and dividend
frequency are positively associated with dividend ratio after controlling for
other fund attributes.
I also find limited evidence supporting Hypothesis 4. The coefficients of risk-
free interest rate in columns (5) and (6) are negative, though not significant
in column (6), given other fund characteristics. The results suggest that funds
are more likely to increase the dividend frequency when the interest rates go
lower. It is consistent with the competition within equity funds.
Finally, we examine the hypothesis that mutual funds trade off interests within
the existing investors with different dividend preferences. I use 12B-1 fees plus
one fourth of front loads, as proposed by Huang et al. (2007), to proxy for
participation costs. The coefficients on PartCost are positive across the first
four columns, suggesting that dividend frequency increases with participation
costs, consistent with Hypothesis 5. The results are also consistent with our
argument that mutual funds have to solve the conflict of interest within existing
investors.
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.2.5.3 Reaction of Investors
In this section, I answer the last question whether and how investors respond
to multi-dividend policy. The ultimate objective for mutual funds is to increase
the assets under management. Mutual funds choose the dividend policy that
could maximize their assets. Therefore, I expect that multi-dividend policy
increases the net inflows controlling for other fund characteristics. To test
this hypothesis, I regress yearly mutual fund net inflows on multi-dividend
dummy, fund characteristics including yearly dividend ratio, and their inter-
action terms following previous literature (e.g., (Barber et al., 2005; Kumar
et al., 2012))16. Table 2.6 reports the results. The first column (left) in each
specification reports the main effects of fund attributes on mutual fund relative
flows. The right column in each regression reports coefficients and t-statistics
on interaction terms between MultiDiv and fund attributes. It describes how
multi-dividend policy alters the main effect coefficients in the left column.
We first investigate the main effects of LnDivRatio on the net mutual fund
flows. The coefficients on LnDivRatio are negative, suggesting that mutual
funds with high dividend ratios have smaller net flows than those with low
dividend ratios. It shows that investors on average avoid investing in the
funds with high dividend overhang. This result is consistent with Graham
and Kumar (2006). They find that retail investors, as a group, prefer non-
dividend-paying stocks over dividend-paying stocks.
Our primary focus is the relationship between dividend policy and fund flow.
We would concentrate on the interaction term between fund characteristics
one period lag behind and MultiDiv. The coefficients on interaction term
MultiDiv-LnDivRatio are significant in the columns (1) and (2). It shows that
multi-dividend policy positively alters the sensitivity of flows to dividend ratio.
The absolute value of the coefficients on the interaction term is much larger
than that of the coefficients on LnDivRatio. It suggests that dividend ratio
is negatively associated with net fund flows in single-dividend funds whereas
positively in multi-dividend funds. It is consistent with our hypothesis that
multi-dividend policy reduces the dividend overhang problem and attracts
more new investors. However, the sensitivity of new flow to risk-free interest
rate is not significant in column (3), which contradicts our prediction.
Then we examine how investors react to the trade-off within investors with
different dividend preferences. The regression reports that the coefficients on
16I exclude the variable Stability in this regression since it greatly decreases the sample size.
Yet, even if I include that variable, the main results remain the same and the coefficients
on that variable are not significant.
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Table 2.6: Multi-Dividend Policy and Mutual Fund Flows
This table reports coefficients and associated t-statistics from OLS regressions of yearly
relative flows on multi-dividend dummy, other fund characteristics, and their interaction
terms. The dependent variables are yearly relative flows. The first column in each regression
reports the main effects of fund attributes and multi-dividend dummy. The second column
reports the interaction effects. All variables are defined in Table 2.2. Pquintile1 is the
lowest performance quintile, defined as min(Prank, 0.2), where Prank is a fund’s percentile
performance relative to other funds in the same segment. It ranges from 0 (the worst funds)
to 1 (the best funds). Pquintile2_4 is the second to fourth performance quintile, defined
as min (Prank-Pquintile1, 0.6). Pquintile5 is the highest performance quintile, estimated as
Prank-Pquintile1-Pquintile2_4. RelFlow is the yearly relative flow after winsorizing at 2%
level. FundRisk is the standard deviation of raw returns during one year. ManFlow is the
yearly relative net flows to fund i’s family. SegFlow is the yearly relative net flows to fund
i’s segment. All other variables are defined in Table 2.2. Year FE, and Segment FE show
whether we include year, and segment fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by fund
and year. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level, and *
indicates significance at 10% level.
Yearly Relative Flowt
(1) (2) (3)
Main Effect Interaction Main Effect Interaction Main Effect Interaction
MultiDivi,t -0.063 -0.087 -0.084
(-1.05) (-1.35) (-1.13)
LnDivRatioi,t−1 -0.660 1.797*** -0.912 1.948*** -1.186 2.047***
(-1.17) (2.96) (-1.52) (3.27) (-1.95) (3.36)
Fundreti,t 0.007*** 0.001***
(5.59) (3.31)
Pquintile1i,t 0.053 0.005 0.066 -0.014
(0.57) (0.03) (0.66) (-0.07)
Pquintile2_4i,t 0.094*** 0.041 0.096*** 0.040
(4.38) (1.41) (4.68) (1.2)
Pquintile5i,t 0.540*** -0.362*** 0.542*** -0.364***
(5.79) (-3.03) (5.61) (-2.9)
PartCosti,t−1 -0.020*** 0.023** -0.019*** 0.021* -0.022*** 0.020*
(-2.63) (1.96) (-2.6) (1.78) (-2.91) (1.66)
BackLoadi,t−1 -0.05136 0.03655 -0.05535 0.048018 -0.04431 0.055293
(-4.04) (0.95) (-4.42) (1.17) (-4.06) (1.28)
No12Bi,t−1 -0.050 *** 0.000 -0.053*** 0.004 -0.053*** 0.008
(-3.41) (0.01) (-3.7) (0.22) (-3.63) (0.23)
LnSizei,t−1 -0.015*** 0.010*** -0.016*** 0.010*** -0.016*** 0.011***
(-6.58) (4.52) (-6.23) (4.53) (-6.71) (4.64)
TurnRatioi,t−1 -0.000** 0.000 -0.000** 0.000 -0.000** 0.000
(-2.26) (0.96) (-2.17) (1.26) (-2.32) (1.33)
LnAgei,t−1 -0.015*** -0.007 -0.017*** -0.005 -0.016*** -0.005
(-2.83) (-0.7) (-2.75) (-0.51) (-2.65) (-0.51)
FundRiski,t−1 -1.091* 0.070 -1.708*** 0.138 -0.462 0.199
(-1.91) (0.18) (-3.04) (0.42) (-1.36) (0.31)
RFi,t -0.046 -0.035
(-0.88) (-0.44)
RelFlowi,t−1 0.318*** 0.028 0.315*** 0.029 0.318*** 0.027006
(8.82) (0.77) (8.54) (0.81) (8.51) (0.8)
ManFlowi,t 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(2.6) (2.39) (2.28)
SegFlowi,t 0.126* 0.261*** 0.398***
(1.79) (2.78) (7.52)
Year FE Yes Yes No
Segment FE Yes Yes Yes
N 9362 9362 9362
R2 0.245 0.243 0.216
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MultiDiv-PartCost is positive and significant. It shows that a multi-dividend
fund has a smaller outflow caused by the participation costs than a single-
dividend fund, which supports our hypothesis 5. The results is also consistent
with the hypothesis that dividend clientele prefer dividends in the purpose of
obtaining incomes for consumption.
.2.6 Conclusions
Corporate dividend policy has been extensively investigated in the literature.
However, mutual fund dividend policy, which is quite different from corporate
dividend policy, draws little attention in the literature. This chapter asks the
question how and why mutual funds determine their dividend policy.
This chapter presents evidence that multi-dividend policy hurts investors and
proposes that multi-dividend policy is the outcome of mutual funds optimally
balancing two different conflicts of interest. The first conflict stems from the
asymmetry of tax burdens between existing and new investors. New investors
have preference to buy funds with low dividend overhang. To attract new in-
vestors, mutual funds have incentives to use multi-dividend policy in order to
decrease dividend overhang. The second conflict of interest stems from the dif-
ferent dividend preferences of existing investors. Some investors might prefer
high frequent distributions whereas some do not. Mutual funds have to trade
off their interest when choosing dividend policy. To examine the hypotheses,
I first relate the dummy for multi-dividend policy and dividend frequency to
fund characteristics. I find dividend policy is associated with fund character-
istics that affect both conflicts of interest. Then we regress fund net flows
on fund characteristics, multi-dividend dummy, and their interaction terms. I
find empirical evidence that multi-dividend policy attracts net flows related to
dividend ratio, a variable associated to the conflict of interest between new and
existing investors. The results show that multi-dividend policy is positively
associated with net flows related to participation cost, a variable that measures
the severity of the conflict of interest within investors. This result implies that
some investors purchase mutual funds for the purpose of generating constant
dividend income.
This chapter starts a new dimension in mutual fund analysis. We relate an
important variation among mutual funds, dividend policy, to investor purchase
decision. The two trade-offs documented in this chapter broaden two different
areas. The first trade-off is associated with the agency problem that some
mutual funds might not favor existing investors but new investors in order to
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maximize their benefits. The second trade-off, on the opposite, represents a
delegation of investment decisions. Both trade-offs stem from the managers’
desire to maximize the asset size under their management. This study helps us
to understand managers’ behaviors on dividend policy and redesign a better
mutual fund fee structure.
This chapter also contributes to a large body of literature in corporate div-
idend policy. First, we provide a new and different type of dividend policy.
Mutual fund dividend policy is highly regulated and different from the one of
other corporates. Therefore, it is possible to test the hypotheses in payout
policy literature while isolating some other factors. For example, DeAngelo
and DeAngelo (2006) argue that Miller and Modigliani (1961) imposes an
assumption to mandate 100% free cash flow payout in every period. It is
difficult to find such corporates that pay out all free cash flows in empirical
tests. However, mutual funds naturally fulfill this requirement. Second, we
first provide evidence on investment purposes of dividend clientele. Previous
literature suspects dividend clientele demands high dividends for financing
their consumption or they have lower tax rates (Becker et al., 2011). Yet the
real reason is difficult to test since some group of investors (e.g., older and
low-income investors) have both characteristics (Becker et al., 2011; Graham
and Kumar, 2006). We present evidence on that some investors chase divi-
dends for the propose of consumption by showing that some investors react to
dividend policy, which tax rationale cannot explain.
3
Who Buys the Worst
Mutual Funds?
Fund Performance and
Investor Characteristics
Contents
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2.1 Investor Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2.2 Mutual Fund Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3 Empirical Strategy and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3.1 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3.2 Who Buys the Worst Mutual Funds? . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3.3 What Mistakes do Investors Make? . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3.4 Fund marketing and investor choices . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
34
3. Who Buys the Worst Mutual Funds?
Fund Performance and Investor Characteristics
.3.1 Introduction
The vast majority of assets under management are invested in actively man-
aged mutual funds despite the abundant empirical evidence that actively man-
aged equity mutual funds, on average, underperform passively managed mu-
tual funds after fees and transaction costs (Gruber, 1996). Moreover, mutual
funds that outperform cannot be identified ex-ante based on past performance
(Carhart, 1997) and true skill is very scarce (Fama and French, 2010). Funds
with negative alpha, however, are not rare and can be identified both from past
performance and fund attributes, such as high fees (Carhart, 1997). Some au-
thors argue that this puzzling evidence can be explained by the presence of
financially unsophisticated investors in the market for mutual funds. Gruber
(1996) was the first to talk about a “disadvantaged” mutual fund clientele.
Despite the appeal of the argument, identifying the disadvantaged clientele
is a difficult task because of lack of comprehensive data on investors’ mutual
fund investment decisions. The available data sets, discussed below, are typi-
cally obtained from micro data from Nordic countries, surveys, and individual
account data provided by a broker. However, it is unclear whether the con-
clusions obtained from those datasets can be extrapolated to the whole US
market, with distinct institutional and cultural characteristics and a differ-
ent competitive structure, and a more heterogeneous investor population than
the subset of investors that operate through one broker. The purpose of this
chapter is to identify the sociodemographic characteristics of investors invest-
ing in the worst mutual funds using a novel data set of US Internet visitors to
websites of mutual fund management companies.
From the point of view of policy design, it is useful to know which groups
of investors, as defined by their sociodemographic characteristics, are more
likely to be financially unsophisticated. This information can allow regulators
to target policies aimed at enhancing investor protection to the most vulner-
able groups. It is also interesting to know whether and how poor financial
decision making contributes to observed wealth inequalities. This question is
particularly relevant if we consider the important role of mutual funds as an
investment vehicle and the potential long-term wealth loss arising from poor
investment decisions.1 Finally, exploring how heterogeneity across investors is
related to differences in financial decision making can shed light on the reasons
why retail investors often fail to make optimal financial decisions.
144.1% households in the US hold mutual fund shares according to the Investment Company
Institute (http://www.ici.org). Moreover, mutual fund investment accounts for 54% and
47% of all investment in Defined Contribution Plans and IRAs, respectively.
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Although the existence of a sufficiently large disadvantaged clientele may make
it possible for underperforming funds to survive, the survival of underperform-
ing funds by itself does not imply that there is heterogeneity in mutual fund
investor sophistication. For instance, all investors could be equally likely to
purchase underperforming funds if there were costs to acquiring and process-
ing the relevant information and those costs were similar across investors. To
investigate whether some investors are more likely than others to choose un-
derperforming funds, the literature has followed two different paths. The first
one looks for indirect evidence that the market for mutual funds is segmented.
Building on Gruber’s (1996) insight, Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2008) show
theoretically that a negative cross-sectional relation between fees and perfor-
mance could emerge in a market with asymmetric information about manage-
rial skill if a fraction of investors have a less than perfectly elastic demand with
respect to fund net performance. These authors show that in equilibrium poor-
quality funds cater to unsophisticated investors exclusively and charge higher
fees. Consistently with this prediction, Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009) re-
port evidence of a negative relation between fees and before-fee performance in
the cross-section of US equity funds. The idea that heterogeneity in financial
sophistication may lead to segmentation of the mutual fund market is also
supported by the empirical evidence that funds distributed through the bro-
ker channel underperform their peers in the direct channel even before sales
charges (Bergstresser et al., 2009; Christoffersen et al., 2013; Del Guercio and
Reuter, 2011).
Another strand of the literature has used surveys, experiments and micro data
to study directly the optimality of investors’ decisions. Alexander et al. (1998)
document that only 16% of survey respondents holding mutual fund shares un-
derstand that higher expenses might result in lower average returns. Choi et al.
(2010) report that a majority of subjects participating in an experiment fail to
minimize fees when choosing among otherwise identical funds. A number of
studies have also explored the relation between investors’ mutual fund choices
and their degree of financial literacy, proneness to behavioral biases, and in-
telligence. Hastings and Tejeda-Ashton (2008) report that individuals that
experience difficulties in providing correct answers to basic financial questions
are less sensitive to mutual fund fees. Using data on individual investors’
trades and end-of-month portfolio holdings from a large discount brokerage
house, Bailey et al. (2011) report that investors that are more prone to behav-
ioral biases, as inferred from their stock trades, are also more likely to make
bad mutual fund choices resulting in poorer performance. Finally, Grinblatt
et al. (2011) link a comprehensive data set on Finnish males’ IQ scores to fund
holdings and find that IQ, which the authors view as a proxy for the cognitive
costs of search, is negatively associated with fund fees, controlling for many
other fund and investor characteristics.
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As mentioned above, regulators may find it useful to know which groups of
investors are more likely to be financially unsophisticated. While financial
literacy, behavioral biases, or IQ, are not observable to regulators, sociodemo-
graphic characteristics are. A number of studies, including those mentioned
above, investigate the association between variables such as age, gender, mar-
ital status, income or education, and mutual fund investment decisions. En-
gström (2007) documents male investors chase funds with better past returns
while male, high educated and more experienced investors choose high-fee
funds. Niebling et al. (2009) report that older, more experienced and wealth-
ier investors are more likely to follow past performance. Tang et al. (2010)
show that younger and higher-income participants make better investment de-
cisions. Bailey et al. (2011) find that older and more experienced investors are
less likely to invest in high-fee funds. They also show that male and young
investors are more likely to chase past returns. Grinblatt et al. (2011) report
that having a university or business degree, working in the finance profession,
and wealth, are associated with choosing low-fee funds. Choi et al. (2010)
do not find any evidence that high SAT scores are related to fees. Finally,
exploiting international heterogeneity, Ferreira et al. (2012) document that
the flow-performance relationship is less convex in the countries with higher
education levels.
An important challenge in this literature is the limited availability of data
on mutual fund investor characteristics, which is in contrast with the large
amount of information on mutual funds (Campbell, 2006; Thaler, 1999). Ta-
ble 3.1 describes the three main sources of data employed in the literature.
The first source of data are micro data from Nordic countries. Engström
(2007) obtains investor characteristics from Statistics Sweden. His database
covers 147,000 individuals, representing 3.5% of the Sweden population. It
provides various sociodemographic characteristics, such as age, gender, edu-
cation, income and marital status. Investor characteristics in Grinblatt et al.
(2011) come from two sources. IQ scores are provided by Finnish Armed
Forces. The other characteristics, such as education, occupation, are from
Statistics Finland. Their sample includes about 7,500 male subjects per year
who hold funds. The second source of data are surveys. Bauer and Smeets
(2010) gather investor characteristic data from the clientele of two socially
responsible banks in the Netherlands. Their sample includes 3,187 individ-
ual investors and 22 mutual funds. Alexander et al. (1998) conduct a survey
covering 2,000 distinct respondents from 6 different distribution channels in
the US. Their investor characteristics include gender, age, education and in-
come. The third source of data are actual transactions carried out through
some broker. The investor characteristics in Bailey et al. (2011) are from a US
discount broker. Their final sample consists of 1,492 different equity mutual
funds and 29,381 investors. Niebling et al. (2009) use a dataset containing
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46,000 distinct individual mutual fund investors provided by a German dis-
count brokerage house. The investor characteristics in both papers incorporate
gender, age, income/wealth and marital status. Tang et al. (2010) collect in-
dividual attributes of nearly one million investors from Vanguard, a leading
401(k) administrator and mutual fund investment manager. Their investor
characteristics include age, sex, plan tenure, non-retirement financial wealth,
household income, home ownership status, and whether the participant had
web access.
Table 3.1: Data Sources for Investor Characteristics Employed in the Literature
Study Data Source Source Type
Grinblatt et al. (2011) Finnish Armed Forces IQ test Micro data
Statistics Finland
Engström (2007) Statistics Sweden Micro data
Bauer and Smeets (2010) Survey in the Netherlands Survey
Alexander et al. (1998) Survey of US fund investors Survey
Bailey et al. (2011) Transactions from a US broker Sample of Investor Transactions
from 1991 to 1996
Tang et al. (2010) 401(K) pension plans in Vanguard Sample of Investor Transactions
Niebling et al. (2009) Transactions from a German broker Sample of Investor Transactions
We contribute to the literature by investigating the relation between mutual
fund investor characteristics and investment decisions using a novel data set
of the sociodemographic characteristics of US Internet visitors to mutual fund
websites. We obtain the data set, which is described in detail in Section 3.2,
from Quantcast, an Internet audience measurer, which provides information
on the sociodemographic composition of visitors to Internet websites. Our data
set has a number of appealing features. First, it captures the characteristics
of nearly all investors who search information through the Internet. We argue
below that there is a substantial overlap between mutual fund investors and In-
ternet visitors to mutual fund websites, which makes our sample representative
of the investor population. Second, the data correspond to the world’s largest
and most-studied market for mutual funds, the US market, which accounts for
approximately half of all worldwide mutual fund assets. At the end of 2011,
assets under management in the Finnish and Sweedish mutual fund markets
were 0.53% and 1.54% of assets under management in the US market, respec-
tively.2 Even abstracting from size, it is an open empirical question whether
results found for those countries can be extrapolated to other countries due
to international differences in household characteristics, culture, institutional
frameworks, and competitive structures (Bover, 2010; Bover et al., 2013; Cre-
mers et al., 2011; Ferreira et al., 2012). Engström and Westerberg (2004) and
Engström (2007) document that investors in Sweden behave differently from
investors in the US. Third, our data set contains some sociodemographic char-
2Data from the Investment Company Institute.
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acteristics which have not been studied before in the literature on mutual fund
choices, such as ethnicity. Fourth, the data are up-to-date and freely avail-
able. In contrast, the data set recently used by Bailey et al. (2011) is from the
1991-1996 period. It is unclear whether investor behavior has experienced any
substantial changes since then. Finally, as opposed to data provided by one
broker, our database covers investors in both the direct and indirect channels.
Del Guercio et al. (2010) argue that funds in the direct and indirect channels
target different types of investors. Arguably, the decision to operate through
a specific broker depends on investor characteristics, which makes a broker-
provided sample not representative of the whole population of mutual fund
investors.
Of course, the data set we employ in this chapter is not caveat-free. First,
investor characteristics must be necessarily aggregated at the management
company level since websites are maintained for fund management companies,
not individual mutual funds. Second, investor sociodemographic characteris-
tics are approximated from those of Internet visitors, which implicitly assumes
the representativeness of the Internet visitors’ sample. Finally, our data set is
a single cross section. Despite these drawbacks, given the scarcity of data on
investor characteristics we believe that our data set is an interesting alternative
to study the determinants of retail investor decisions.
In our analysis, we start by defining the worst funds as those with poor fore-
casted alphas. To estimate forecasted alpha, we follow the literature and
regress measures of risk-adjusted performance on fund characteristics that have
been documented to predict performance. Then, we use a logit model to ex-
amine the association between investor sociodemographic characteristics and
the probability that the fund’s forecasted alpha belongs to the bottom of the
distribution.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that mutual
funds with a higher fraction of female, older, and low-income investors have a
higher probability of belonging to the group of worst funds. We also document
that funds with a higher fraction of African American investors are associated
with better predicted performance. Investor education, however, does not
appear to be associated with the optimality of investment decisions. Second,
we document that the inferior decisions of some groups of investors result
mainly from a failure to react to poor past performance and fund fees. Third,
we investigate whether the decision to invest in underperforming funds by
some groups of investors is induced by a higher sensitivity to fund marketing,
i.e., brokers’ advice and advertising. We do not find evidence supporting that
hypothesis with a single exception: the oldest investors.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides the back-
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ground of our data, the database description and summary statistics. Section
3.3 describes the empirical strategy and presents the chapter’s results. Section
3.4 concludes.
.3.2 Data
.3.2.1 Investor Characteristics
Quantcast estimates the sociodemographic characteristics of visitors to Inter-
net websites by combining two different sources of data: Directly Measured
Data (DMD) and Multiple Reference Data (MRD). Quantcast collects com-
prehensive census records of media consumption from 80,000 partner publish-
ers covering 10 million website destinations each month, including websites,
blogs, videos, widgets, and advertising campaigns. DMD represent the media
consumption activity of over 200 million people in the US. Quantcast also col-
lects Multiple Reference Data (MRD), such as click-stream and non-personally
identifiable information user data, from market research companies, Internet
service providers (ISPs) and toolbar vendors covering over 1.5 million users
in the US. The methodology employed by Quantcast extrapolates information
on investor characteristics obtained from MRD to all the covered websites by
using a vast amount of data on visitors’ activity contained in DMD.3
Internet visitor characteristics are a good proxy for investor characteristics only
to the extent that sociodemographic characteristics are distributed similarly in
both groups. There are reasons to believe that the sets of fund investors and
mutual fund website visitors largely overlap. The Internet has become one of
the most important tools for investors, especially for retail investors, to obtain
information on mutual funds. Da et al. (2011) provide evidence that Internet
search activity correlates with retail investor attention. In a 2010 survey of
mutual fund investors conducted by the Investment Company Institute (ICI),
almost all respondents report that they have Internet access at home and 82%
of investors use the Internet for financial purposes. Among households with
mutual funds, 79% access their financial accounts through Internet; 58% use
Internet to get investing information; 21% of mutual fund households buy mu-
tual funds directly through Internet (Bogdan et al., 2010). Other sources of
data are indicative that visitors to mutual fund family websites invest with
3See Quantcast Methodology Overview, available at http://www.quantcast.com/white-
papers/quantcast-methodology.pdf, for further details.
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those mutual fund families. For example, according to the Internet traffic
company, Compete, during January 2011, www.fidelity.com, the official web-
site of Fidelity mutual funds management company, was visited by 5,647,728
unique visitors, among which, 4,656,329, reached login.fidelity.com. That is,
at least 82% of Fidelity web visitors hold investment accounts with Fidelity.4
Below, we document that the distribution of sociodemographic characteristics
is similar in both our data of mutual fund website visitors and mutual fund
investors, while the characteristics of mutual fund website visitors are different
from those of Internet users.
Admittedly, our database suffers from self-selection, as the decision to oper-
ate through the Internet is likely to be endogenous to investor characteristics.
However, self-selection does not necessarily invalidate inference about differ-
ences in investor characteristics between unsophisticated investors (those who
purchase bad funds) and sophisticated investors based on the Internet sample.
It could be argued that usage of Internet depends on investor sophistication
but not on other investor characteristics. In that case, the distribution of in-
vestor sociodemographic characteristics among both the unsophisticated and
the sophisticated groups remains unaltered in the Internet sample relative to
the general population. If the probability that an investor operates through
the Internet depends on the investor’s sociodemographic characteristics but
not on sophistication, certain categories of investors will be overrepresented
in the Internet sample relative to the entire population, which will bias the
distribution of sociodemographic characteristics among both unsophisticated
and sophisticated investors. Under the null hypothesis that sociodemographic
characteristics have the same distribution within both types of investors, the
bias in the distribution is identical for both, so the null holds true for the Inter-
net sample, too. The only cause for concern is that the probability of operating
through the Internet depends on both sophistication and investor characteris-
tics. In this paper, we implicitly assume that Internet usage depends on either
investor sociodemographic characteristics or sophistication but not on both.
We keep the largest 250 management companies in terms of assets under man-
agement in June 2010. We drop the smallest mutual fund management com-
panies because information on their websites is typically unavailable or noisy
due to the small number of visitors. We employ information from CRSP and
search engines (Google or Bing) to obtain web addresses of mutual fund man-
agement companies. If there are several websites or addresses pointing to
the same management company, we choose the one with largest number of
clicks. For example, there are two domains pointing to Columbia management
company: www.columbiafunds.com and www.excelsiorfunds.com. Yet, we use
the former since it has more clicks than the latter: According to Quantcast,
4The data is downloadable from www.compete.com
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www.columbiafunds.com has 12,800 visitors per month while so few clicks are
recorded on www.excelsiorfunds.com that Quantcast cannot give any informa-
tion.
We input those websites into Quantcast to obtain investor characteristics.
Quantcast offers data on the composition of website visitors in terms of vari-
ous sociodemographic characteristics in six categories: gender, age, ethnicity,
parenthood, income and education. Table 3.2 shows definitions of the variables
for investor characteristics. We are able to obtain statistics for 207 manage-
ment companies as of June 2010. We have verified that sociodemographic
characteristics of Internet visitors exhibit almost no variation through time.
Therefore, we perform our analysis on a single cross-section.
Table 3.2: Definition of Variables for Investor Sociodemographic Characteristics
Category Variable Definition
Gender Male Percentage of male visitors
Female Percentage of female visitors
Age 3-12 Percentage of visitors from 3 to 12 years old
13-17 Percentage of visitors from 13 to 17 years old
18-34 Percentage of visitors from 18 to 34 years old
35-49 Percentage of visitors from 35 to 49 years old
50+ Percentage of visitors above 50 years old
Ethnicity Cauc Percentage of Caucasian visitors
AfrAm Percentage of African American visitors
Asian Percentage of Asian visitors
Hisp Percentage of Hispanic visitors
Other Percentage of other visitors
Children Has Kids0-17 Percentage of visitors with 0-17 year-old children
No Kids0-17 Percentage of visitors without 0-17 year-old children
Income 0K-30K Percentage of visitors with income of 0-30 thousand dollars per year
30K-60K Percentage of visitors with income of 30-60 thousand dollars per year
60K-100K Percentage of visitors with income of 60-100 thousand dollars per year
100K+ Percentage of visitors with income of more than 100 thousand dollars per year
Education No College Percentage of visitors without entering college
College Percentage of visitors with college degree
Postgrad Percentage of visitors with postgraduate degree
Table 3.3 compares the characteristics of mutual fund website visitors in our
database with those of all Internet users and actual mutual fund investors.
Columns (1), (2) and (3) report the mean, median and asset-weighted mean
of website visitors, respectively. Column (4) shows the characteristics of all
Internet users, as estimated by Quantcast. Columns (5) and (6) report the
composition of Internet users older than 3 years and 16 years, respectively, as
reported by the National Telecommunications & Information Administration
(NTIA). Column (7) presents the compositions of investors as reported by the
Investment Company Institute.
Considering the differences in categorization across databases, we find that the
distribution of individual characteristics in our sample is very similar to that of
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Table 3.3: Characteristics of Mutual Fund Website Visitors, Internet Users, and
Mutual Fund Investors
The table shows the summary statistics of the percentages of investors belonging to
different sociodemographic groups in the sample of mutual fund website visitors, the
population of Internet users and the population of mutual fund investors. Variables
are defined in Table 2. The database of mutual fund website visitors, columns (1), (2)
and (3), is obtained for June, 2010. Internet population characteristics in column (4)
are obtained for June, 2012. The Internet population characteristics, columns (5) and
(6), are provided by the National Telecommunications & Information Administration
(NTIA) for 2010. The two columns (5) and (6) correspond to the population older
than 3 years and 16 years, respectively. Mutual fund investor characteristics, column
(7), are reported by the Investment Company Institute (ICI) for 2010. Figures have
been adjusted in order to make the categories homogeneous across columns. In
column (1), standard deviations are given in parentheses.
Mutual Fund Website Visitors Internet Users Mutual Fund
Investors
Mean Median Asset- Quantcast NTIA NTIA ICI
Weighted 2010(3+) 2010(16+)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Male 57.80 (9.36) 59 57.79 49 48.93 48.44 18
Female 42.20 (9.36) 41 42.2 51 51.07 51.56 20
Co-decided 62
3-12 2.84 (2.22) 3 1.32
13-17 6.30 (4.73) 5 3.08
0-18 16 20.97
18-34 20.68 (8.53) 19.5 19.06 29 24.45 33.14* 15
35-49 29.84 (8.69) 30 30.92 27.5 21.27 26.06 33.5
50+ 40.41 (13.59) 40 45.69 24.5 33.3 40.8 51.5
Cauc 80.20 (9.51) 81 83.17 76 65.14 67.49 90
AfrAm 6.99 (7.25) 5 5.45 9 12.01 11.59 5
Asian 6.62 (6.30) 4 5.68 4 4.59 4.65 2
Hisp. 5.04 (3.45) 5 4.73 10 15.87 14.26 5
Other 1.11 (0.65) 1 0.83 1 0.5 0.59 4
No Kids0-17 76.89 (8.73) 78 80.71 59.36
Has Kids0-17 23.11 (8.73) 22 19.29 41.47
0K-30K 16.58 (7.54) 15 13.64 18 30.27 29.96 11
30K-60K 27.48 (7.93) 26 25.66 26 27.46 27.88 24
60K-100K 28.79 (7.54) 29 30.16 28 23.1 23.26 31
100K+ 27.11 (8.69) 26.5 30.67 28 19.17 18.9 36
No College 33.65 (8.81) 33 35.06 45 40
College 43.80 (7.47) 43 42.98 41 34
Postgrad 22.59 (8.25) 22 22.03 14 26
*From 16 to 34 years old.
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all mutual fund investors.5 Also, individuals in our database, just like mutual
fund investors, do not appear to be a representative sample of all Internet
users. For example, our data shows that 45.69% of visitors to mutual fund
websites (asset-weighted) are older than 50 years. This figure is close to the
fraction of all mutual fund investors that belong to the same age group, 51.5%,
but higher than the fraction of Internet users in the same category, between one
quarter and one third. Similarly, mutual fund website visitors in the lowest-
income group are only 13.64%, which is consistent with 11% of all mutual
fund investors reported to belong to that group, and much lower than 30%,
which is the fraction of all low-income Internet users, as reported by NTIA.
The data are in line with those of Bogdan et al. (2010), who document that
older, poorer and lower educated investors are associated with a lower level of
Internet usage. The results of Table 3.3 provide support to the idea that the
sample of mutual fund website visitors is representative of the population of
mutual fund investors.
.3.2.2 Mutual Fund Performance
We obtain mutual fund data from the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free Mutual Fund
Database spanning from January 1995 to June 2010. The dataset includes
all active mutual funds during that period. Following the previous literature
(Carhart, 1997; Chen et al., 2004; Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú, 2009), we keep
domestic equity mutual funds as defined by their investment objectives codes.
We also exclude index, and institutional funds identified by both fund names
and CRSP identifiers. We use fund names to identify funds with multiple
share classes and compute for each fund the asset-weighted mean of each of
the following fund characteristics: return, expense ratio, management fee, 12b-
1 fee, front and rear load. Fund age is calculated as the difference in months
between the first offer date of the oldest class in the portfolio and the current
date. We sum total net assets for all classes in the portfolio. Following Elton
et al. (2011) and Evans (2010), we drop funds with total net assets below $15
million and age less than 36 months. Our final dataset consists of 284,371 fund-
month observations corresponding to 3,754 distinct funds across 204 months.
For each month, we have an average of 1,394 funds and 357 management
companies.
5Categorizations of different investor characteristics are not exactly the same across
databases. For example, Quantcast uses three categories for education: “No College”,
“College” and “Postgraduate”, whereas ICI uses 4 categories: “High school graduate or
less”, “Associate’s degree or some college”, “Completed college” and “Some graduate
school or completed graduate school.” To homogenize categories, we assume that half of
the ”Associate’s degree or some college” is categorized as ”College” in Quantcast data
while the other half is corresponding to ”No college”.
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We estimate risk-adjusted performance, alpha, using the four-factor model
proposed by Carhart (1997):
ri,t = αi + βrm,irmt + βsmb,ismbt + βhml,ihmlt + βmom,imomt + εi,t (3.1)
Where ri,t is the net return in month t in excess of the one month T-bill return;
αi is the fund’s alpha and captures the fund’s risk-adjusted performance; rmt is
the market portfolio return in excess of the risk-free rate; smbt is the return on
a portfolio of small stocks minus large stock; hmlt is the return on a portfolio
long high book-to-market stocks and short low book-to-market stocks; momt
is the return difference between stocks with high and low past return in the
past 12 months.6
We run (3.1) for each month t (from January, 1998 to June, 2008) using data
from the prior 3 years (from t−36 to t−1) . We require at least 30 non-missing
observations over the prior 36 months. We then define the realized alpha for
fund i at period t, αi,t, as the fund’s after-fee return minus the realized risk
premium:
αi,t ≡ ri,t − (βˆrm,irmt + βˆsmb,ismbt + βˆhml,ihmlt + βˆmom,imomt) (3.2)
We are interested in identifying mutual funds that can be predicted to un-
derperform. To obtain a proxy for future forecasted alpha, we first regress
realized alpha on lagged fund characteristics that have been documented to
predict future performance using monthly data from June 1998 to June 2008.
In particular, we follow Chen et al. (2004) and regress realized alpha on fund
size, family size, fund age, expense ratio, turnover ratio, and past returns in
the previous 12 months:
αi,t = µi + γ1LnTNAt−1 + γ2LogFsizet−1
+ γ3Turnovert−1 + γ4LnAget−1 + γ5Expratiot−1
+ γ6Totloadt−1 + γ7Flowt−1 + γ8FundRett−1 + εi,t, (3.3)
where LnTNA, LogFsize, Turnover, LnAge, Expratio, Totload, Flow and
FundRet are defined in Table 3.4.
We use both the Fama-MacBeth two-stage regressions and pooled OLS to es-
timate (3.3). Table 3.5 reports the results. Columns (1) and (2) show the coef-
ficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) using pooled OLS and Fama-MacBeth
methods, respectively. Results are similar for both methods. Because not all
6Data are obtained from Kenneth French’s Website.
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Table 3.4: Definition of Variables for Mutual Fund Characteristics
Variable Definition Units
TNA Total net asset under management of the portfolio million
LnTNA Natural logarithm of TNA
under management of the portfolio million
LogFsize Natural logarithm of total net asset million
under management of the mutual fund company
Turnover Minimum of aggregate sales or purchases divided % per year
by the average TNA over the past 12 months
LnAge Natural logarithm of the differences months
between the date and the first offered date
Expratio Total fund’s operating expenses divided by the year-end TNA %
Totload Max front-end load charged plus the rear-end load %
for holding 48 months as a proportion of investment
Flow New fund flow in this month divided by the fund lagged TNA %
FundRet Cumulative fund return over the past one year %
variables are significantly associated with future performance, we rerun the
regression using significant explanatory variables only. The results of the new
model are shown in columns (3) and (4), respectively.
We then calculate predicted alpha, which we denote by α̂i,t+1, as the product of
the estimated coefficients in equation (3.3) and the fund characteristics at time
t. We transform the fund characteristics from panel data to cross-sectional
data by averaging variables from July 2008 to June 2010. We require at least 12
non-missing values to compute the mean. Table 3.6 reports summary statistics
for our dataset.
Finally, we merge investor characteristics with fund data. Although our mu-
tual fund data contains information on 2,446 mutual funds, we have investor
characteristic data for 193 mutual fund management companies managing
1,858 funds, which represent more than 90% assets of the mutual fund sam-
ple.
.3.3 Empirical Strategy and Results
.3.3.1 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy has two parts. First, we define the group of “the
worst funds” as those whose predicted alpha, is in the 15% or 20% bottom
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Table 3.5: Fund Performance and Lagged Fund Characteristics
The table displays the results from monthly regressions of fund performance on
lagged fund characteristics for each month from January, 1998 to June, 2008. Fund
performance is calculated as realized alpha, i.e., fund return minus the product of
betas and factor realizations using Carhart’s four-factor model. Variables are defined
in Table 4. Regressions are estimated using the Fama-MacBeth approach in columns
(1) and (3) and pooled OLS with month fixed effects in columns (2) and (4). The
t-statistics are adjusted using Newey-West (1987) with lags of order three in Fama-
MacBeth and clustered by fund and time in pooled OLS regressions. The t-statistics
are shown in the parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates
significance at 5% level and * indicates significance at 10% level.The coefficients
reported are 100 times larger than the real value.
Realized Alpha
Pooled OLS Fama-MacBeth Pooled OLS Fama-MacBeth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LnTNAt−1 -2.547** -1.900** -4.162** -4.232 ***
(-2.383) (-2.160) (-2.282) (-4.593)
LogFsizet−1 0.834* 0.53 0.2946
(1.737) (1.136) (0.248)
Turnovert−1 -0.036 -0.010
(-0.879) (-0.261)
LnAget−1 3.307*** 2.370*** 8.122 *** 7.06 ***
(2.970) (2.638) (3.776) (4.929)
Expratiot−1 -7.815* -7.250 ** -12.009** -8.704**
(-1.902) (-1.988) (-2.154) (-2.136)
Totloadt−1 -1.351 -1.180
(-0.699) (-0.674)
Flowt−1 0.517 0.550
(0.764) (1.289)
FundRett−1 0.995** 0.770*** 4.087 *** 3.987***
(2.226) (2.773) (13.854) (18.109)
Intercept -186.951*** -91.309*** -411.679*** -445.097***
(-3.442) (-3.057) (-13.941) (-14.805)
Month Fixed Effects YES NO YES NO
N 102748 102748 115316 115389
Adjusted R2 0.071 0.081 0.222 0.241
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Table 3.6: Summary Statistics of Fund Characteristics
The table shows the summary statistics of variables for fund characteristics. Pre-
dicted alpha (Pooled OLS) and Predicted alpha (Fama-MacBeth) is calculated as the
product of the vector of fund characteristics at time t and the vector of estimated
coefficients from pooled OLS and Fama-MacBeth regressions, respectively. 12b-1fee
is the percentage of the total assets attributed to marketing and distribution costs.
All other variables are defined in Table 4. Variables are time-series means computed
over the period from June, 2008 to June, 2010.
Obs Mean Std. Dev. 25% Median 75%
Predicted alpha(Pooled OLS) 1254 0.006 1.059 -0.286 -0.136 0.036
Predicted alpha(Fama-MacBeth) 1254 -0.474 1.035 -0.764 -0.618 -0.446
FundRet 1405 99.842 27.502 92.214 95.354 99.505
Total load 2446 0.271 0.428 0.000 0.000 0.500
12b-1fee 2446 0.139 18.764 0.000 0.026 0.250
Expratio 1863 1.165 0.340 0.963 1.162 1.390
LnTNA 2446 5.248 1.584 3.988 5.106 6.332
LnAge 2446 4.870 0.669 4.447 4.870 5.254
of the cross-sectional distribution of predicted alphas, with predicted alpha
calculated as the mean of the time series of α̂i,t+1 from July 2008 to June
2010.
We then estimate a logit model to investigate how the sociodemographic char-
acteristics of investors are associated with fund quality. More specifically, we
model the probability of a fund belonging to the underperformers’ group as a
function of the characteristics of the investors in the fund’s family:
P (Yi = 1) =
1
1 + exp(−α− βXi − εi) , (3.4)
Where Yi is a dummy variable that equals 1 if fund i belongs to the “worst
funds” group and 0 otherwise, and Xi is a vector of explanatory variables
containing Female, 35-49, 50+, AfrAm, Asian, Hisp, 30K-60K, 60K-100K,
100K+, College, Postgrad as defined in Table 3.2.7
7We assume that all mutual fund investors are adults (older than 18 years). Therefore, we
treat positive fractions of Internet visitors in age groups 3-12 and 13-17 in the Internet
database as errors. We eliminate them and re-scale other variables in age category so
that their sum is one for each fund. We also drop variables in the Kid category from
investor characteristics because they are highly correlated with Age. Male, 18-34, Cauc,
0K-30K, No College serve as the omitted categories for gender, age, ethnicity, income
and education, respectively. The correlation table is available from the authors upon
request.
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.3.3.2 Who Buys the Worst Mutual Funds?
In Table 3.7, we report the chapter’s main results. The table contains coef-
ficients and marginal effects as well as test statistics (z-values), of the logit
regression (3.4) with standard errors clustered at the management company
level. The marginal effects and reference probabilities are calculated at the
average values of regressors. For the sake of providing a more complete pic-
ture of the relation between investor characteristics and fund choices, we also
estimate a logit model for the probability of the fund being in the group of
funds with highest predicted alpha.
We start by analyzing how gender relates to fund choices. The coefficients and
marginal effects for Female are positive and statistically significant across all
four proxies of predicted alpha in columns (1) to (4). The marginal effects re-
veal that a one percent increase in the proportion of female investors increases
the probability that a fund is in the worst performance group by 0.45%. This
result suggests that the fraction of female investors is higher in funds expected
to underperform. A possible explanation for this association is that female
investors are, on average, less financially sophisticated than male investors.
This conclusion is consistent with Lusardi and Mitchell (2011), who report
that women are less financially literate than men. Also, Engström (2007) and
Bailey et al. (2011) document that male investors are more likely to follow
past mutual fund returns. If less return-chasing implies that females are less
sensitive to performance, then female investors would face a higher risk of
staying in funds that have underperformed in the past and are more likely to
underperform in the future. The coefficients on Female reported in columns
(5) to (8), corresponding to the probability of a fund belonging to the top-
performing group, are negative although the coefficients in specifications (5)
and (7) are not significant.
The coefficients and marginal effects for age group variables 35-49 and 50+
are positive and significant in columns (1) to (4). These results indicate that
the fraction of middle-aged and older investors is higher in funds with lowest
predicted alphas. A one percent increase in the proportion of investors in
the 35-49 and 50+ age groups increases the probabilities of a fund being bad
by 0.8% and 0.4%, respectively. Therefore, young investors (omitted category)
appear to exhibit more ability to stay away from future underperformers. This
finding is consistent with Bailey et al. (2011), who show that age is negatively
related to return-chasing behavior and with Tang et al. (2010), who find that
young investors experience smaller losses from inefficient investment choices.
The coefficient for 35-49 is positive but larger than that of 50+ in columns (1)
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Table 3.7: Investor Characteristics and Predicted Performance
The table reports coefficients and marginal effects and associated z-values from a
logit regression for the probability that the fund belongs to the group of funds with
bottom/top predicted alpha. The first, second and third row of each variable reports
coefficients, marginal effects and z-statistics, respectively. The dependent variable
equals 1 if a fund’s predicted alpha is at the bottom/top 15%/20%. Predicted alpha is
calculated as the time-series mean of predicted alphas calculated by Fama-MacBeth
(F-M) or pooled OLS (OLS) regressions from June, 2008 to June, 2010. All other
variables are defined in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered by management com-
pany. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level and
* indicates significance at 10% level.
Predicted Alpha
15% bottom 20% bottom 15% bottom 20% bottom 15% top 20% top 15% top 20% top
(F-M) (F-M) (OLS) (OLS) (F-M) (F-M) (OLS) (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female 3.728** 2.497* 3.524** 3.146** -1.744 -3.699** -1.895 -3.857***
0.457** 0.394* 0.430** 0.494** -0.215 -0.579** -0.234 -0.603***
(2.362) (1.736) (2.229) (2.083) (-1.219) (-2.505) (-1.291) (-2.649)
35-49 6.428*** 5.666*** 6.452*** 5.862*** -1.548 -1.231 -1.490 -1.596
0.788*** 0.893*** 0.787*** 0.921*** -0.191 -0.193 -0.184 -0.25
(2.826) (2.905) (2.826) (2.938) (-0.940) (-0.713) (-0.883) (-0.938)
50+ 3.256** 2.496* 3.216** 2.676** -1.615 -1.396 -1.445 -1.643
0.399** 0.393* 0.392** 0.420** -0.200 -0.218 -0.178 -0.257
(2.00) (1.877) (1.964) (2.019) (-1.204) (-1.080) (-1.042) (-1.314)
Afram -3.745 -5.134* -3.863 -5.788** 5.817*** 4.412** 5.750*** 4.596**
-0.459 -0.809* -0.471 -0.909** 0.718*** 0.690** 0.709*** 0.719**
(-1.358) (-1.952) (-1.390) (-2.039) (3.119) (2.197) (3.034) (2.325)
Asian -2.869 -1.032 -2.807 -1.82 -1.977 -0.688 -2.037 -0.545
-0.352 -0.163 -0.342 -0.286 -0.244 -0.108 -0.251 -0.085
(-0.971) (-0.435) (-0.943) (-0.742) (-0.897) (-0.342) (-0.899) (-0.271)
Hisp -2.235 -1.23 -2.658 -1.765 -5.676* -1.303 -6.202* -0.879
-0.230 -0.159 -0.246 -0.117 -0.701* -0.204 -0.764* -0.137
(-0.455) (-0.304) (-0.487) (-0.222) (-1.686) (-0.513) (-1.674) (-0.367)
30K-60K -2.235 -1.230 -2.658 -1.765 1.185 1.676 1.418 1.495
-0.274 -0.194 -0.324 -0.277 0.146 0.262 0.175 0.234
(-0.828) (-0.486) (-0.988) (-0.704) (0.518) (0.709) (0.597) (0.627)
60K-100K -5.045** -3.727 -5.194** -4.087* 3.183 2.837 3.311 2.994
-0.618** -0.587 -0.634** -0.642* 0.393 0.444 0.408 0.468
(-2.035) (-1.614) (-2.096) (-1.771) (1.444) (1.330) (1.500) (1.422)
100K+ -3.854 -3.183 -4.028* -3.476 0.197 0.263 0.161 0.76
-0.473 -0.502 -0.491* -0.546 0.024 0.041 0.020 0.119
(-1.600) (-1.365) (-1.677) (-1.564) (0.099) (0.134) (0.080) (0.394)
College -0.599 -2.565 -0.826 -2.172 2.906 1.213 2.906 0.85
-0.073 -0.404 -0.101 -0.341 0.359 0.19 0.358 0.133
(-0.280) (-1.332) (-0.386) (-1.147) (1.284) (0.548) (1.157) (0.396)
Postgrad 4.950* 2.559 4.81* 2.654 1.783 -0.055 2.138 -0.205
0.607* 0.403 0.587* 0.417 0.220 -0.009 0.264 -0.032
(1.724) (0.977) (1.672) (1.045) (0.853) (-0.028) (1.001) (-0.104)
N 980 980 980 980 980 980 980 980
Pseudo R2 0.043 0.034 0.043 0.036 0.033 0.027 0.034 0.028
Ref. Prob. 0.143 0.196 0.142 0.195 0.144 0.194 0.144 0.194
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to (4), implying that the relationship between age and optimality of mutual
fund choice is U-shaped. This result is not consistent with the finding by
Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) that age has an inverted U-shape association
with financial literacy. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that
mutual fund investors are not representative of the entire population in each
age period. Mutual fund participation rates vary with age. ICI reports that
age has an invert U-shaped effect on mutual fund ownership (Bogdan et al.,
2010), being lowest for the young (18-34 years old) and the older (older than
65 years) groups, but peaks in the middle (35-64 years old) of the life cycle.
Therefore, the young and older individuals who invest in mutual funds might
possess more financial knowledge than their peers at their age.
When we turn our attention to the association between investor income and
mutual fund choices, we find that the coefficients on 60K-100K are negative
and significant in columns (1), (3) and (4). The coefficients on 30K-60K
and 100K+ are also negative, consistently with the idea that high-income in-
vestors are more likely to avoid low-quality funds, although the coefficients are
smaller than those on 60K-100K and not significant. Therefore, the associa-
tion between investor income and optimality of investor choices appears to be
positive, consistently with the literature (Bailey et al., 2011; Engström, 2007),
but not strictly monotonic. Tang et al. (2010) find that high-income investors
experience smaller losses from inefficient investment choices.
Coefficients on ethnicity-based categories are all negative (Caucasian is the
omitted variable), although only the coefficient on the African American cate-
gory is statistically different from zero when the underperforming fund group
consists of funds with predicted alpha in the bottom 20%. This result suggests
that the worst funds are associated with lower fraction of African American
investors and higher fraction of Caucasian investors. Moreover, we also re-
port positive and significant coefficients of Afram in columns (5)-(8), which
suggests that African Americans are strongly associated with top funds: A
one percent shift in the fraction of African American investors increases the
probability of a fund being good by 0.70%. Some previous studies show evi-
dence that African Americans are associated with less financial literacy (See
Bowen, 2008). However, according to Straight (2002), differences between
African Americans and Caucasians are due to other socioeconomic charac-
teristics, such as income or education. It should also be noted that African
American mutual fund investors are not a representative sample of the whole
African American population. African Americans both in our sample and in
the mutual fund population are underrepresented (5% of mutual fund investors
as opposed to 13.6% in the entire US population).8 Therefore, we cannot eas-
ily extrapolate findings obtained from representative samples to the sample of
8http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-06.pdf
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African American mutual fund investors.
Finally, we find that education is not associated with better mutual fund
choices. None of the coefficients are significant. If anything, there is a weakly
positive association between the fraction of investors with postgraduate de-
grees and the probability of the fund belonging to the underperforming group.
These results are consistent with those of Lusardi and Mitchell (2011), that
education is not perfectly correlated with financial literacy. Grinblatt et al.
(2011) find that, after controlling for fund families, there is no significant as-
sociation between investor education and mutual fund fees.
Our investor characteristics data are aggregated at the management company
level, i.e., funds in the same management company share the same investor
characteristics. As a consequence, our proxy for investor characteristics is
more representative of the characteristics of investors in funds with larger size
and/or more shareholders within the company. However, in the regression
analysis all funds receive the same weight. If overrepresented funds exhibit bet-
ter performance than average, then both outperforming and underperforming
funds in the fund family will be matched to the characteristics of sophisticated
investors. On the other hand, if overrepresented funds exhibit worse perfor-
mance than average, then both underperforming and outperforming funds will
be matched to the characteristics of unsophisticated investors. Depending on
how performance is distributed within management companies, aggregation
could bias the relationship between investor characteristics and mutual fund
performance in either direction. Of course, this problem would be less severe
the fewer the number of funds per management company. As a robustness
test, we repeat the analysis with a restricted sample that includes only fam-
ilies with fewer funds than the sample median. Table 3.8 shows the results.
Although coefficients are not significant in some specifications, the results are
generally consistent with those obtained for the full sample.
.3.3.3 What Mistakes do Investors Make?
Our measure of predicted alpha is a function of four fund characteristics: size,
age, expense ratio, and past performance. Therefore, if one investor char-
acteristic is associated with poor predicted performance, that characteristic
must necessarily be associated with one or more predictors of mutual fund
performance, or with another variable that is correlated with predictors of
performance. In order to gain further insight into the results of Table 3.7, we
investigate why a higher fraction of certain sociodemographic groups charac-
terize funds with poor predicted performance. More specifically, we ask which
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Table 3.8: Robustness Test: Families with Few Funds
The table reports coefficients and marginal effects and associated z-values from a
logit regression for the probability that the fund belongs to the group of funds with
bottom/top predicted alpha. Regressions include only funds that belong to families
whose number of funds in our sample is below the median. The first, second and third
row of each variable reports coefficients, marginal effects and z-statistics, respectively.
The dependent variable equals one if a fund’s predicted alpha is at the bottom/top
15%/20%. Predicted alpha is calculated as the time-series mean of predicted alphas
calculated by Fama-MacBeth (F-M) or pooled OLS (OLS) regressions from June,
2008 to June, 2010. All other variables are defined in Table 2. Standard errors
are clustered by management company. *** indicates significance at 1% level, **
indicates significance at 5% level and * indicates significance at 10% level.
Predicted Alpha
15% bottom 20% bottom 15% bottom 20% bottom
(F-M) (F-M) (OLS) (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 2.949 2.497* 3.524** 3.146**
0.365 0.394* 0.430** 0.494**
(1.585) (1.724) (2.170) (2.081)
35-49 4.997** 5.666*** 6.452*** 5.862***
0.618** 0.893*** 0.787*** 0.921***
(2.148) (2.927) (2.824) (2.954)
50+ 3.303* 2.496* 3.216* 2.676**
0.409* 0.393* 0.392* 0.420**
(1.706 ) (1.822 ) (1.91) (1.979 )
Afram -0.259 -5.134** -3.863 -5.788**
-0.032 -0.809** -0.471 -0.909**
(-0.129 ) (-1.977 ) (-1.414 ) (-2.052 )
Asian -6.209** -1.032 -2.807 -1.82
-0.768** -0.163 -0.342 -0.286
(-2.452 ) (-0.433 ) (-0.926 ) (-0.738 )
Hisp 4.019 -1.009 -2.015 -0.743
0.497 -0.159 -0.246 -0.117
(0.789 ) (-0.303 ) (-0.486 ) (-0.222 )
30K-60K -1.504 -1.23 -2.658 -1.765
-0.186 -0.194 -0.324 -0.277
(-0.553 ) (-0.484 ) (-0.984 ) (-0.701 )
60K-100K -3.326 -3.727 -5.194** -4.087*
-0.412 -0.587 -0.634** -0.642*
(-1.384 ) (-1.612 ) (-2.135 ) (-1.783 )
100K+ -1.919 -3.183 -4.028* -3.476
-0.238 -0.502 -0.491* -0.546
(-0.786 ) (-1.34 ) (-1.67) (-1.553 )
College 0.762 -2.565 -0.826 -2.172
0.094 -0.404 -0.101 -0.341
(0.323) (-1.356) (-0.389 ) (-1.162)
Postgrad 6.772** 2.559 4.81 2.654
0.838** 0.403 0.587 0.417
(2.114 ) (0.961) (1.608) (1.033)
N 526 526 526 526
Pseudo R2 0.057 0.034 0.043 0.036
Ref. Prob. 0.145 0.196 0.142 0.195
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specific fund characteristics are associated with investor groups buying the
worst performing funds. To answer this question, we estimate a logit model
for the probability that the fund is in either tail of the distribution of each
of the fund characteristics that predict fund performance. As explanatory
variables we include the same investor characteristics as in Table 3.7, i.e., the
percentage of investors of each sociodemographic group, as well as performance
predictors other than the fund characteristic in question.
Table 3.9: Investor and Fund Characteristics
The table reports coefficients and marginal effects and associated z-values from a
logit regression for the probability of the fund belonging to the group of funds with
bottom/top fund characteristics corresponding to the first row of the table. The
first, second and third row of each variable report coefficients, marginal effects and
z-statistics, respectively. The dependent variable equals 1 if a fund’s characteristic is
at the top/bottom 15%. Marketing Fees equals 12b-1 fees plus one fourth of load fees.
All other variables are defined in Tables 2 and 4. Standard errors are clustered by
management company. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance
at 5% level and * indicates significance at 10% level.
Size Exp Ratio Age Past Returns Marketing
15% top 15% bottom 15% top 15% bottom 15% top 15% bottom 15% top 15% bottom 15% top 15% bottom
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Female -2.935* -1.592 2.435 -2.762* -0.466 -0.651 -2.728* 3.061** 1.225 -8.980***
-0.324* -0.105 0.236 -0.284* -0.065 -0.025 -0.320* 0.355** 0.106 -1.059***
(-1.876) (-0.635) (1.428) (-1.663) (-0.341) (-0.458) (-1.794) (2.115) (0.624) (-2.828)
35-49 6.391*** 0.329 1.065 -3.584 -2.241 3.022 -1.445 6.460*** 6.574* -4.125
0.706*** 0.022 0.103 -0.369 -0.313 0.116 -0.170 0.750*** 0.569* -0.486
(2.669) (0.169) (0.388) (-1.541) (-1.298) (1.424) (-0.900) (3.047) (1.881) (-1.302)
50+ 2.089 0.131 1.979 -1.647 -0.011 -0.205 -1.995 3.522** 5.123** -5.782**
0.231 0.009 0.192 -0.169 -0.001 -0.008 -0.234 0.409** 0.443** -0.682**
(1.191) (0.088) (1.019) (-0.978) (-0.009) (-0.118) (-1.627) (2.332) (2.229) (-2.213)
Afram -0.214 -1.452 -1.576 4.071* -1.123 -1.262 5.215*** -6.234* 1.800 -7.749*
-0.024 -0.096 -0.153 0.419* -0.157 -0.049 0.612*** -0.724* -0.156 -0.914*
(-0.121) (-0.615) (-0.447) (1.878) (-0.417) (-0.432) (2.576) (-1.953) (-0.686) (-1.652)
Asian 6.026*** -1.301 -4.708 2.932 -3.634 3.842* -0.392 -3.289 -7.048** 1.590
0.666*** -0.086 -0.456 0.301 -0.507 0.148* -0.046 -0.382 -0.610** 0.187
(2.605) (-0.466) (-1.484) (1.513) (-1.361) (1.954) (-0.185) (-1.209) (-2.053) (0.439)
Hisp 1.431 -1.309 -5.457 2.047 2.204 2.419 -2.679 -0.178 7.069*** 0.371
0.158 -0.087 -0.529 0.210 0.307 0.093 -0.315 -0.021 0.612*** 0.044
(0.530) (-0.256) (-1.348) (0.849) (0.631) (0.897) (-0.919) (-0.043) (2.709) (0.072)
30K-60K 1.935 -1.565 1.708 4.167 -1.317 -5.471* 2.546 -4.611 4.305 -0.407
0.214 -0.104 0.166 0.429 -0.184 -0.211* 0.299 -0.535 0.373 -0.048
(0.563) (-0.587) (0.636) (1.289) (-0.538) (-1.954) (0.966) (-1.621) (1.096) (-0.086)
60K-100K 4.292 -7.460** 1.704 5.300* -0.140 -6.881** 4.246* -6.142** 5.782 2.865
0.475 -0.494** 0.165 0.545* -0.020 -0.265** 0.499* -0.713** 0.501 0.338
(1.418) (-2.272) (0.658) (1.802) (-0.051) (-2.554) (1.684) (-2.428) (1.627) (0.678)
100K+ 7.302** -1.659 -1.753 5.911** 0.098 -2.718 3.679 -4.430** 6.442* 0.357
0.807** -0.110 -0.170 0.608** 0.014 -0.105 0.432 -0.514** 0.558* 0.042
(2.442) (-0.623) (-0.740) (2.190) (0.050) (-1.318) (1.504) (-2.046) (1.859) (0.095)
College -4.188 -0.620 -0.366 -2.534 -0.987 -6.681** -0.390 0.151 -5.375** -0.099
-0.463 -0.041 -0.036 -0.261 -0.138 -0.257** -0.046 0.018 -0.465** -0.012
(-1.595) (-0.192) (-0.205) (-0.891) (-0.574) (-2.279) (-0.151) (0.077) (-1.964) (-0.029)
Postgrad -4.742** -1.685 2.329 4.094 1.434 -7.044*** 0.774 5.286*** -3.676 2.572
-0.524** -0.112 0.226 0.421 0.200 -0.271*** 0.091 0.614*** -0.318 0.303
(-2.123) (-0.543) (1.201) (1.607) (0.784) (-2.739) (0.356) (2.736) (-1.374) (0.849)
Size -0.569*** 0.382*** 0.494*** -0.422*** 0.060 -0.152** 0.192** -0.088
-0.055*** 0.039*** 0.069*** -0.016*** 0.007 -0.018** 0.017** -0.010
(-6.782) (4.507) (7.886) (-4.600) (0.593) (-2.031) (2.197) (-1.008)
Exp Ratio -1.763*** 1.792*** 0.081 -1.000* 0.889** 0.146 4.441*** -2.540***
-0.195*** 0.119*** 0.011 -0.039* 0.104** 0.017 0.384*** -0.300***
(-5.200) (4.164) (0.264) (-1.847) (2.167) (0.463) (5.952) (-4.161)
Age 1.204*** -0.795*** -0.250* -0.430* -0.279 -0.138 -0.524** 0.199
0.133*** -0.053*** -0.024* -0.044* -0.033 -0.016 -0.045** 0.023
(7.730) (-3.671) (-1.720) (-1.833) (-1.626) (-0.846) (-2.084) (1.290)
Past Returns 0.004 0.008** -0.008 -0.013** -0.003 0.010*** -0.020*** 0.006
0.000 0.001** -0.001 -0.001** -0.000 0.000*** -0.002*** 0.001
(1.180) (2.011) (-1.344) (-2.008) (-1.021) (3.495) (-2.783) (1.059)
N 1061 1061 1061 1061 1061 1061 1061 1061 1061 1061
Pseudo-R2 0.189 0.100 0.128 0.109 0.094 0.107 0.041 0.058 0.277 0.163
Ref. Prob. 0.127 0.071 0.108 0.116 0.168 0.040 0.136 0.134 0.096 0.137
54
3. Who Buys the Worst Mutual Funds?
Fund Performance and Investor Characteristics
Columns (1)-(8) of Table 3.9 report estimated coefficients and marginal effects
from the logit regressions for the probability that the fund is in the bottom
and top of the distribution of each one of the four performance predictors.
The threshold to define the top and bottom of the distribution is 15%. The
coefficients and marginal effects on Female are negative and significant for the
probability that the fund has a low expense ratio and a high recent return,
and are positive and highly significant for the probability that the fund has
a low recent return. These findings suggest that the association between the
fraction of female investors and poor predicted performance reported above
happens both through female investors’ presence in funds with poor recent
performance, and through their absence from funds with low expenses and
high recent performance. However, Female is also negatively associated with
the probability that the fund is among the largest, which tend to have lower
predicted performance.
In Table 3.7, we report a negative association between investor age, especially
the 35-49 variable, and predicted performance. The results of Table 3.9 sug-
gest that this association is driven by two forces that move investors in the
same direction. First, a higher fraction of investors in the 35-49 age group
is associated with a higher probability of the fund managing a large amount
of assets. Second, investors in that age group, as well as older investors, are
positively and significantly associated with poor recent performance.
Higher-income investors appear to be more present in funds with the lowest
expense ratios and less present in funds with worst recent performance and the
youngest funds. These results could explain the positive association between
investor income and predicted performance. On the other hand, the fraction
of higher-income investors (more clearly so, those in the 60K-100K income
group) is negatively associated with the probability that the fund is among
the smallest, which tend to perform better.
Table 3.9 also suggests that the percentage of African American investors in
the fund is positively associated with low expense ratios and with good recent
performance, consistently with the results of Table 3.7.
Finally, investors in the Postgrad group appear to avoid the largest and youngest
funds, which tend to perform worse. However, they are drawn to funds with
very poor recent returns, which explains why this group of investors is associ-
ated with poor predicted performance.
Taken together, these results indicate that it is mainly differences in sensitivity
to past performance across investor sociodemographic groups and, in some
cases, differences in sensitivity to expense ratios, what can explain systematic
differences in the optimality of investor choices.
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.3.3.4 Fund marketing and investor choices
The results of columns (1)-(8) in Table 3.9 are useful to understand why the
choices of some investor groups lead to worse predicted performance. How-
ever, they do not explain the reasons behind those choices, that is, why some
investors fail to avoid funds that have underperformed in the past and can
be predicted to underperform in the future. While a comprehensive answer
to this important question is beyond the scope of this chapter, we may in-
vestigate whether management companies’ actions play a role in investors’
choices. More specifically, our data enable us to study whether there exists
an association between marketing effort, as proxied by the fund’s marketing
fees, and the investment decisions of the disadvantaged clientele. Our ques-
tion is motivated by the idea that the disadvantaged clientele is more likely
to be influenced by management companies’ marketing efforts, i.e., advertis-
ing and brokers’ advice, which induce them to invest more than the rest of
investors in underperforming funds. Indeed, a number of studies find an asso-
ciation between marketing and worse-quality funds. Bergstresser et al. (2009)
report that funds distributed through brokers underperform their peers, even
before distribution fees, in the direct distribution channel. Also, there is lit-
tle evidence that mutual fund advertising signals future superior performance
(Gallaher et al., 2006; Jain and Wu, 2000). A slightly different interpretation
is that unsophisticated investors exhibit a stronger preference for financial ad-
vice, so fund families catering to these investors face a weaker incentive to
generate alpha and, instead, spend resources on distribution (Del Guercio and
Reuter, 2011). Under either of these hypotheses, we would expect funds with
high marketing fees to attract the groups of investors that are associated with
poor predicted performance.
An alternative explanation about the mechanism that drives the empirical
results presented in this chapter is that the disadvantaged clientele lacks the
knowledge, expertise, or skills to identify funds with poor past performance,
while the rest of investors can identify those funds through their own research
or through analysts’ reports. Under this hypothesis, underperforming funds
have a higher fraction of unsophisticated investors due to the sophisticated
investors’ decision to avoid those funds. In this case, we would expect no
association between high marketing fees and the investor characteristics that
are associated with poor predicted performance.
In columns (9) and (10) of Table 3.9, we estimate logit regressions for the
probability that the fund’s marketing fees are in the top and bottom 15%
of the distribution, respectively. In both cases, we control for performance
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predictors. Following Sirri and Tufano (1998), we define annual marketing
fees as 12b-1 fees plus the sum of front-end and back-end loads amortized over
the average holding period.9 The coefficient on Female is not significant for
the probability that the fund has high marketing fees. These findings seem to
favor the hypothesis that female investors’ choices are not the consequence of
this group of investor being more vulnerable to marketing.
The coefficients on 35-49 and 50+ for the probability that the fund charges
top marketing fees are both positive and significant, which suggests that older
investors’ choice of recent underperforming funds could be explained by their
preference for heavily marketed funds. This is especially the case for investors
in the 50+ age group.
We do not find a negative association between the fraction of high-income in-
vestors and marketing effort, suggesting that the poorer choices of low-income
investors are not explained by marketing. Finally, the coefficient on Postgrad
for the probability that the fund charges high marketing fees is not positive,
so the results for this group of investors reported above are not explained by
marketing, either.
Therefore, heterogeneity in marketing sensitivity (or preference for marketed
funds) across groups of investors cannot explain differences in the optimality
of mutual fund choices found in this chapter, except for the case of older
investors.
.3.4 Conclusions
Although a number of previous studies assume the presence of unsophisti-
cated investors in the mutual fund market, there is only limited evidence on
the observable characteristics of those investors, mainly due to a lack of com-
prehensive databases on investor characteristics and their mutual fund choices.
We overcome this limitation by using a novel data set of the sociodemographic
characteristics of US Internet visitors to mutual fund websites to investigate
the relation between mutual fund investor characteristics and investment de-
cisions. We report evidence suggesting that mutual fund investors and visitors
to mutual fund websites largely overlap, and consequently, the distribution of
sociodemographic characteristics is similar in both populations.
9We amortize loads by dividing them by a holding period of four years because this is
approximately the average holding period for US mutual fund investors in more recent
years according to Bogle (2005).
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Our chapter makes three contributions to the literature on investors’ mutual
fund choices. First, we report direct empirical evidence on the heterogeneity
of investor sophistication in the US mutual fund market: Investor sociode-
mographic characteristics are systematically associated with funds’ predicted
performance. More specifically, funds with a higher fraction of female in-
vestors are more likely to have a low predicted performance. Also, older and
low-income investors are associated with worse investment decisions. How-
ever, the relation between both age and income and the optimality of investor
decisions is not strictly monotonic. We find evidence that the fraction African-
American visitors is associated with top-performing funds. Interestingly, we do
not find a positive relation between the optimality of mutual fund investment
decisions and education levels.
Second, our results suggest that differences in mutual fund choices across in-
vestor sociodemographic groups arise in most cases from the fact that not all
investors react in the same way to past performance and expense ratios.
Third, we find no clear evidence that differences in mutual fund choices across
investor groups are driven by different sensitivities to fund marketing or differ-
ent preferences for advice. Only the oldest investors exhibit a greater tendency
to purchase heavily marketed funds.
Our findings are of interest to regulators in three ways. First, regulators may
identify vulnerable investors ex ante on the basis of their sociodemographic
characteristics, which are observable. This enables policy makers to target
their policies to specific groups. Second, our analysis reveals the kind of infor-
mation that is ignored by the “disadvantaged clientele” and, therefore, can be
used as a guidance in the design of policies aimed at enhancing transparency.
Finally, despite the evidence that marketing is associated with differences in
net-of-fee fund performance across funds, our results do not suggest that dif-
ferences in mutual fund choices across groups of investors are explained by
differences in responsiveness to marketing effort.
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.4.1 Introduction
Since the publication of Miller and Modigliani’s seminal paper, dividends have
been one of the thorniest puzzles in corporate finance (Allen et al., 2000).
One of the popular explanations of their presence is that some investors, par-
ticularly older and low income individuals, have a preference for dividends
(Becker et al., 2011; Graham and Kumar, 2006). The literature terms those in-
vestors “dividend clienteles”. However, despite the fact that the existence and
the characteristics of dividend clienteles for stocks have been well-discussed,
whether there are dividend clienteles for mutual funds and their characteris-
tics are unresolved questions. The purpose of this chapter is to address those
questions. More specifically, I use the sociodemographic characteristics of US
visitors to mutual fund management companies’ websites to proxy for investor
characteristics and regress the dividend frequency and quantity on the investor
characteristics.
Understanding who the dividend clienteles are in the mutual fund market is
important for several reasons. First, investor behavior clearly affects mutual
fund strategies, particularly, their investment styles and dividend policy. Desai
and Jin (2011) document that the firm dividend policy is affected by the
existence of dividend clienteles in the stock market. Similarly, if there are
dividend clienteles in the mutual fund market, some mutual funds may try
to attract those investors by deliberately choosing dividend policy. Moreover,
dividends paid by firms vary across firm characteristics (such as size or age)
that are associated with investment styles (Fama and French, 2001). To be
able to implement a certain dividend policy, mutual funds have to adjust their
investing styles. Second, the characteristics of dividend clienteles in the mutual
fund market are helpful to identify unsophisticated investors. Harris et al.
(2012) find evidence that mutual fund dividend quantity is associated with
the presence of unsophisticated investors. As such, it is important for investor
protection. Third, it is important for us to understand the segmentation of
the mutual fund market. Limited competition and market segmentation are
discussed in many previous studies.1 In Chapter 2, I find evidence that if an
investor’s main goal is to obtain a regular income stream, he/she would care
less about performance. Therefore, it is possible that mutual funds segment
the market by their dividend policy. This may provide an explanation of why
some investors do not leave the funds with worst performance.
Previous literature documents the existence of dividend clienteles in the stock
1See, for example, Huang et al. (2007), Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009) and Del Guercio
et al. (2010).
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market by showing that certain types of investors have a preference for div-
idends. Miller and Modigliani (1961) and Shefrin and Thaler (1988) are the
first to conjecture that retired (older) investors, or any other investors with
a pronounced need for a regular income stream, would prefer income stocks
for consumption purposes. These authors argue that, because of self-control,
dividend clienteles may prefer dividends over “home made” dividends, i.e., in-
come generated by the partial liquidation of the holdings. Consistent with
their arguments and conjectures, Graham and Kumar (2006) and Becker et al.
(2011) provide strong empirical evidence of the existence of dividend clienteles
by showing that older and low income investors are likely to favor stocks with
dividend distributions.
However, the mutual fund market is different from the stock market in sev-
eral aspects. First of all, the composition of investors is different between two
markets. The Investment Company Institute (ICI) reports that an estimated
92 million individual investors owned mutual funds in the US at the end of
2012. And those investors held 89 percent of total mutual fund assets. How-
ever, less than 30 percent of total stock assets are held by individual investors.2
The dominating position of institutional investors in the stock market suggests
that corporate dividend policy is used to cater to institutional investors rather
than retail investors. Second, mutual fund dividend payout is, as described
in Chapter 2, highly regulated while a corporate has more flexibility to pay
dividends. In the US, mutual funds are registered as regulated investment
companies. The mutual funds do not need to pay certain types of corporate
taxes if they fulfill some restrictions. One of the restrictions is that a mutual
fund has to pay out all the dividends collected from stocks at the end of the
year. Therefore, the differences in the characteristics of dividend payers are
large. For example, Denis and Osobov (2008) document that in the stock mar-
ket, dividends are concentrated among the largest, most profitable companies
in the stock market: Less than 20% of stocks pay dividends in 2002. Yet,
paying dividends seems to be prevalent among mutual funds because of the
pass-through regulation. In my sample, more than 63% of funds pay dividends
in a single year. Therefore, whether dividend clienteles for mutual funds exist
and the composition of these clienteles are open to questions.
In Chapter 2, I presume that dividend clienteles exist and their motivation
is to generate a regular income stream to finance consumption. I test this
joint hypothesis and some empirical evidence supporting it. I find that the
sensitivity of flows to participation cost varies across the dividend policy, i.e.,
a multi-dividend fund has a smaller outflow than a single-dividend funds given
participation cost. Harris et al. (2012) document similar results in terms of
dividend quantity. They show that some funds purchase stocks before divi-
2http://www.learningmarkets.com/understanding-institutional-ownership/
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dend payment dates to artificially increase their dividend yields. However, the
authors argue that the theory of dividend clientele cannot explain this anomaly
because it is not the optimal way to collect the dividends. Their argument is
based on the assumption that the dividend clienteles should only collect div-
idends without paying any costs. However, by definition, dividend clienteles
are willing to trade some costs for dividends. For example, a clientele always
needs to pay the tax if he/she receives dividends from a stock even if he/she
has a low tax rate. The results documented by Harris et al. (2012), to the
contrary, support the theory of dividend clientele. To further investigate the
dividend clienteles in the mutual fund market, I try to provide direct evidence
by documenting who those dividend clienteles are, i.e., the sociodemographic
characteristics of dividend clienteles.
This paper also contribute to literature by examining the motivation of divi-
dend clienteles. Previous studies suspect that investors have two motivations
to prefer dividends: Investors might use dividends to finance their consump-
tion and/or they have a lower tax rate.3 However, there is no direct evidence
of what really motivates dividend clienteles. The literature shows the existence
of dividend clienteles by documenting that older and low income investors are
more likely to be dividend clienteles in the stock market. Yet those investors
who typically have pronounced needs to finance their consumption also have
lower tax rates at the same time. As Becker et al. (2011) state in their paper,
“...older investors likely have more pronounced needs to ‘cash out’ larger por-
tions of their portfolios for consumption and also likely have lower tax rates
on dividends relative to younger investors... In this paper, we do not address
the reasons for seniors’ preference for dividends...”. The existence of dividend
clienteles in the mutual fund market helps to examine their motivation. Be-
cause of the special regulation of mutual fund dividend distribution (e.g., pass
through regulation), mutual fund dividend distribution has two dimensions:
frequency and quantity. Those two attributes can be interpreted as corre-
sponding to the two motivations for a dividend preferences described above.
If a dividend clientele invests in a mutual fund for the purpose of obtaining
a regular income stream, he/she would choose the mutual funds with more
frequent dividend distributions, but not the funds with large dividend distri-
butions. The dividend clientele could obtain the amount of dividend as he/she
wants by changing the initial investment. For example, if an investor expect
to receive $100 per year, he/she can either invest in 10 shares of a fund with
$10 dividend or 100 shares of another fund with $1 dividend. Yet the dividend
clientele cannot decide the effect of dividend frequency if we implicitly assume
that dividend clienteles prefer receiving dividends over partially selling funds
as Shefrin and Thaler (1988) argue. On the other side, if a dividend clien-
3See, for example, Shefrin and Thaler (1988), Graham and Kumar (2006) and Becker et al.
(2011) for more details.
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tele prefer dividends because he/she has a low tax rate, the dividend clientele
might not be concerned about dividend frequency because the dividend fre-
quency has no effect or, at most, a small effect, on the taxes he/she pays.
Therefore, the dividend clientele may prefer the funds with large dividend dis-
tributions. The results in Chapter 2 show some evidence of the consumption
rationale. This chapter provides more empirical evidence of the motivation of
dividend clienteles in the mutual fund market.
The main results of this chapter are as follows. First, I document some evi-
dence of the existence of dividend clienteles in the mutual fund market. I find
that low income and older investors are associated with funds paying dividend
more frequently. This result is consistent with my expectation and previ-
ous studies. Second, I do not find any significant evidence of a relationship
between the size of dividend distributions and investor characteristics. This
result plausibly suggests that the tax rationale cannot explain that existence
of dividend clienteles in the mutual fund market.
.4.2 Data
I use the sociodemographic characteristics of US visitors to mutual fund web-
sites to proxy for investor characteristics. I obtain the the sociodemographic
characteristics of US visitors to mutual fund websites from Quantcast, an In-
ternet audience measurer. Quantcast provides provides information on the
sociodemographic composition of visitors to Internet websites. For example,
62% of the visitors to the website of Vanguard asset management company
are male while the other 38% are female. Quantcast estimates the sociodemo-
graphic characteristics of visitors to websites using two sources of databases.
The first one is the directly measured data, which covers 10 million web-
site destinations and over 200 million people in the US. The second one is
multiple reference data which covers over 1.5 millions individuals in the US.
Quantcast has non-personally identifiable information user data and the infor-
mation on their click-stream. Quantcast uses statistical methods to combine
the two databases. For more detail, please check the Quantcast Methodology
Overview4.
I first use public information to obtain the websites for mutual fund man-
agement companies. I input the websites into Quantcast to collect the char-
acteristics of the visitors to each website. Because there are few visitors to
the websites of mutual fund management companies that are extremely small,
4http://www.quantcast.com/white-papers/quantcast-methodology.pdf
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I only keep the largest 250 mutual fund management companies in terms of
assets under management. Finally, I obtain sociodemographic characteristics
of visitors to websites belonging to 207 management companies as of June
2010. Chapter 3 provides more details and summary statistics. Table 3.3
provides evidence that visitors to mutual fund websites and mutual fund in-
vestors largely overlap. The sociodemographic characteristics of visitors to
mutual fund websites are close to the characteristics of mutual fund investors
but far from the characteristics of Internet users. This evidence suggests that
the sociodemographic characteristics of US visitors to mutual fund websites
are a good proxy for investor characteristics.
I obtain the mutual fund data from CRSP Survivor-Bias Free Mutual Fund
Database. Because the investor characteristics are obtained in 2010, I perform
the fund characteristics as cross-sectional data in 2010. Following standard
use in the mutual fund literature, I focus on cap-based and style-based do-
mestic equity mutual funds defined by the Lipper objective codes, i.e., LCVE,
MLVE, EI, EIEI, LCCE, MLCE, LCGE, MLGE, MCVE, MCCE, MCGE,
SCVE, SCCE, and SCGE. I also drop the institutional and index funds fol-
lowing CRSP identifiers, i.e., index_fund_flag and inst_fund. A mutual fund
may be counted multiple times in the database if it has several share classes.
I eliminate such redundant observations by computing the fund characteris-
tics as the asset-weighted means of class characteristics if the classes share the
same fund identifier code, crsp_cl_grp, provided by CRSP. Following Elton
et al. (2011) and Evans (2010), I drop the funds with total net assets below $15
million and whose age is less than 36 months. Finally, the database contains
a sample of 2,153 distinct funds.
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics. I identify dividend distributions as
mutual fund dividends if the first letter of dis_type in CRSP is “D”. I define
dividend ratio as the distribution amount over reinvestment price and the vari-
able DivRatio as the yearly dividend ratio, which is calculated as the sum of
dividend ratio during a calendar year. LnDivRatio is the natural logarithm
of the dividend ratio plus 1. Some mutual funds pay dividends several times
in a short period or even in the same day, typically when dividends belong to
different types (e.g., income dividend and qualified income dividend). There-
fore, I consider dividend distributions in the same month as one time. I count
the numbers of months when a mutual fund pays dividends (from 0 to 12) as
DivFreq. I define a multi-dividend dummy, MultiDiv, which is equal to 1 if
dividend frequency is larger than one, and zero otherwise. The definitions of
other variables of interest are the same as in the previous literature. LnSize is
the nature logarithm of total net asset under fund management. LnAge is the
nature logarithm of age in months. FrontLoad is the front load. ExpRatio is
the expense ratio defined as total operating expenses divided by the year-end
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics for our sample. DivRatio is the sum of the
dividend ratio, defined as distribution amount over reinvestment price, for each dividend
distribution during the whole year. LnDivRatio is the natural logarithm of the dividend
ratio plus 1. DivFreq is the number of months in which a fund pays dividends. MultiDiv
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if DivFreq is larger than 1, and 0 if DivFreq is equal to
1. LnSize is the nature logarithm of total net asset under fund management. LnAge is the
natural logarithm of age in months. FrontLoad is the front load. ExpRatio is the expense
ratio defined as total operating expenses divided by the year-end total net assets. TurnRatio
is the turnover ratio. FundRet is the raw return for the past 12 months (buy and hold).
Summary Statistics
Mean SD Median 1st perc. 99th perc. N
DivRatio (%) 0.533 0.865 0.189 0.000 3.273 2153
LnDivRatio (%) 0.528 0.839 0.189 0.000 3.221 2153
DivFreq (times) 1.643 1.286 1 1 5 2153
MultiDiv 0.367 0.482 0 0 1 2153
LnSize ($ million) 5.844 1.542 5.751 3.049 9.920 2096
LnAge (month) 5.025 0.583 5.017 3.932 6.756 2153
FrontLoad (%) 1.459 2.127 0.000 0.000 5.750 2108
ExpRatio (%) 1.251 0.394 1.279 0.190 2.260 1476
TurnRatio (%) 80.136 91.255 59.000 3.000 427.000 1464
Fundret (%) 18.677 6.362 17.149 8.008 34.292 1761
total net assets. TurnRatio is the turnover ratio. FundRet is the raw return
for the past 12 months (buy and hold). To fully understand the database,
I provide the correlation coefficients among variables of interest. Table 4.2
shows the results. Female is the percentage of female visitors. 35-49 is the
percentage of visitors from 35 to 49 years old. 50+ is the percentage of visi-
tors above 50 years old. Afram is the percentage of African American visitors.
Asian is the percentage of Asian visitors. Hisp is the percentage of Hispanic
visitors. 30K-60K is the percentage of visitors with income of 30-60 thousand
dollars per year. 60K-100K is the percentage of visitors with income of 60-100
thousand dollars per year. 100K+ is the percentage of visitors with income of
more than 100 thousand dollars per year. College is the percentage of visitors
with college degree. Postgrad is the percentage of visitors with postgraduate
degree. It is worth noting that LnDivRatio is positively associated with Mul-
tiDiv. This correlation is consistent with my argument in Chapter 2: Mutual
funds with high undistributed dividends are more likely to use multi-dividend
policy.
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.4.3 Empirical Strategy
The main purpose of this chapter is to identify the sociodemographic char-
acteristics of mutual fund investors who exhibit a preference for dividends.
Previous studies on dividend clienteles in the stock market identify the char-
acteristics of investors who prefer dividends, measured in terms of dividend
quantity. Yet, because of the pass-through dividend policy, mutual fund div-
idend payout has two dimensions: frequency and quantity. Those dimensions
are correlated but different. Admittedly, the dividend frequency of a mutual
fund is positively associated with dividend quantity as I show in Table 4.2.
However, funds with high undistributed dividends need not distribute them
several times during the year. They can always keep the dividends and pay
them out at the end of the year.5 At the same time, it is possible that an
investor might prefer funds with more frequent dividend payouts but not with
a large dividend payout, or vice versa. In this chapter, I will consider both
types of investors, those who prefer more frequent dividend distributions, and
those who prefer a huge amount of dividends paid during the year. I use both
dividend frequency and dividend quantity as dependent variables.
I estimate a logit model to investigate how the sociodemographic characteris-
tics of investors are associated with the frequency of fund dividend payouts.
More specifically, I model the probability of a fund using multi-dividend policy
as a function of the characteristics of the investors in the fund’s family, con-
trolling for fund characteristics. To model the association between dividend
quantity and investor characteristics, I regress the quantity of dividends paid
in 2010 on investor characteristics.
.4.4 Empirical Results
Table 4.3 reports the results of the regressions of fund dividend payout, (e.g.,
frequency or quantity), on investor characteristics. Column (1) and (2) show
the coefficients, marginal effects, and associated z-values from a logit regres-
sion for the probability that the fund follows a multi-dividend policy. The
dependent variable is MultiDiv. Column (3) and (4) report the coefficients
and t-statistics of OLS regression of dividend quantity, proxied by LnDivRa-
tio, on investor characteristics. LnDivRatio is the natural logarithm of the sum
5See the discussion in Chapter 2.
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of the dividend ratio for each dividend distribution during the whole year plus
one where dividend ratio is defined as distribution amount over reinvestment
price.
The coefficients for 35-49 and 50+ are positive and significant for 50+ when
the dividend frequency is the proxy of dividend clienteles in columns (1) and
(2). This results suggest that older investors are positively associated with
dummy for dividend frequency. Or in other words, older investors are more
likely to hold multi-dividend funds. A one percent increase in the proportion
of investors in the 50+ age groups increases the probabilities of a fund using
multi-dividend policy by 1.2%.
We find that the coefficients for income group varialbes 30K-60K, 60K-100K
and 100K+ are negative in columns (1) and (2), though the coefficients on
60K-100K are not significant. A one percent shift in the fraction of 30K-
60K, 60K-100K and 100K+ investors decrease the probability of a fund using
multi-dividend policy by 1.7%, 1.3% and 2.1%, respectively. The results are
consistent with the idea that low-income investors are more likely to hold
multi-dividend funds.
In sum, I find that the results are partly consistent with my expectation and
previous literature (Becker et al., 2011; Graham and Kumar, 2006), that older
and low-income investors are likely to be dividend clienteles, measured in terms
of dividend frequency.
Interestingly, no coefficient is statistically significant at conventional signif-
icance levels if dividend quantity is the dependent variable, as reported in
columns (3) and (4) of table 4.3 when the proxy for dividend clienteles is the
dividend quantity. This result cannot be explained by the tax rationale theory.
If an investor prefers dividends because he/she has a lower tax rate, he/she
should be sensitive to quantity rather than dividend frequency. However,
if dividend clienteles buy mutual funds for the purpose of receiving regular
dividend streams, they would, as I argue above, care more about dividend
frequency. This is consistent with my argument in Chapter 2.
.4.5 Conclusions and Future Research
This chapter identifies the characteristics of dividend clienteles in the mutual
fund market by using the sociodemographic characteristics of US visitors to
mutual fund websites to proxy for investor characteristics. The results suggest
that low income and older investors are associated with multi-dividend policy
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Table 4.3: Investor Characteristics and Dividend Clienteles
The table reports the results of the regressions of fund dividend payout (measured by the
frequency or quantity of dividend distributions) on investor characteristics. Columns (1) and
(2) report the coefficients, marginal effects, and associated z-values from a logit regression
for the probability that the fund uses multi-dividend policy. The first, second and third
row of each variable report coefficients, marginal effects and z-statistics, respectively. The
dependent value isMultiDiv defined as dummy variable that equals one if dividend frequency
is larger than 1, and 0 otherwise. Columns (3) and (4) report the coefficients and t-statistics
of OLS regressions of LnDivRatio on investor characteristics. LnDivRatio is the natural
logarithm of the sum of the dividend ratio for each dividend distribution during the whole
year plus 1 where dividend ratio is defined as distribution amount over reinvestment price.
Female is the percentage of female visitors. 35-49 is the percentage of visitors from 35 to
49 years of age. 50+ is the percentage of visitors above 50 years of age. Afram is the
percentage of African American visitors. Asian is the percentage of Asian visitors. Hisp
is the percentage of Hispanic visitors. 30K-60K is the percentage of visitors with income
of 30-60 thousand dollars per year. 60K-100K is the percentage of visitors with income of
60-100 thousand dollars per year. 100K+ is the percentage of visitors with income of more
than 100 thousand dollars per year. College is the percentage of visitors with college degree.
Postgrad is the percentage of visitors with postgraduate degree. The fund characteristics
controls include the stability of the dividend payout, expense ratio, yearly relative flows, size,
turnover ratio and fund raw performance defined in Chapter 3. Standard errors are clustered
by management company. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at
5% level and * indicates significance at 10% level.
MultiDiv MultiDiv LnDivRatio LnDivRatio
(1) (2) (3) (5)
Female 2.333 3.305 -0.007 -0.008
0.583 0.826
(0.928) (1.299) (-0.996) (-1.182)
35-49 2.134 2.349 -0.011 -0.012
0.533 0.587
(0.723) (0.802) (-1.010) (-1.113)
50+ 4.517** 4.794** -0.000 -0.003
1.129** 1.199**
(2.188) (2.280) (-0.078) (-0.518)
Afram 3.412 2.682 0.037 0.035
0.853 0.670
(1.206) (1.075) (1.331) (1.341)
Asian -2.659 -3.777 0.014 0.015
-0.665 -0.944
(-0.859) (-1.238) (1.354) (1.505)
Hisp 0.330 1.181 -0.013 -0.013
0.082 0.295
(0.106) (0.364) (-1.457) (-1.550)
30K-60K -6.824* -6.950* 0.009 0.013
-1.705* -1.737*
(-1.667) (-1.673) (0.525) (0.704)
60K-100K -5.284 -5.640 0.013 0.016
-1.320 -1.410
(-1.259) (-1.347) (0.903) (1.088)
100K+ -8.569** -8.833** 0.009 0.013
-2.141** -2.208**
(-2.164) (-2.181) (0.618) (0.881)
College 0.016 0.446 -0.005 -0.005
0.004 0.111
(0.005) (0.149) (-0.710) (-0.676)
Gradsch -0.186 -0.217 0.002 0.002
-0.046 -0.054
(-0.058) (-0.065) (0.338) (0.344)
LnDivRatio 93.692***
23.422***
(4.054)
MultiDiv 0.003**
(2.545)
Fund Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Segment Fix Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 506 506 513 513
Pseudo R2 0.203 0.231 0.246 0.263
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but not with a large quantity of dividends. A plausible explanation for these
results is that dividend clienteles in the mutual fund market exist because
they use dividends to finance their consumption, not because they have low
tax rates.
Fama and French (2001) document the phenomenon that corporates pay less
and less dividends over time. “The proportion of corporates paying cash divi-
dends falls from 66.5% in 1978 to 20.8% in 1999” while Desai and Jin (2011)
document a similar number, 19.1% in 2002. However, the proportion of mutual
funds paying dividends increases from 46.2% in 2000 to 67.7% in 2011. The
sharp contrast suggests that the demand for dividends in the stock market de-
creases while it increases in the mutual fund market. It is interesting to wonder
why. One possible explanation is that the demand for dividends mainly comes
from individual investors. When individual investors leave the stock market
and enter the mutual fund market, the demand for dividends is transferred
from the stock market to the mutual fund market. This conjecture may be
helpful in explaining the long-time unsolved dividend puzzle. More specifi-
cally, the phenomenon cannot be explained by signalling motives or catering
theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2004) but only the dividend clienteles.6
Another interesting topic is associated with investors psychological sentiment.
Mutual funds pay two types of incomes to investors: dividend and capital
gain. Unlike stocks, mutual fund investors receive capital gains passively, i.e.,
investors do not need to actively sell mutual funds, whereas stock investors
receive capital gains only when they actively realize the appreciation of their
holdings. It is still not clear whether mutual fund investors distinguish divi-
dends from capital gains as proposed by Shefrin and Statman (1984). If mutual
fund investors could recognize the differences between dividends and capital
gains, another interesting question arises: Do mutual fund dividend clienteles
prefer capital gains over dividends? Capital gains may be a better alternative
to dividends to generate regular income streams because the tax rate on cap-
ital gains is always lower than that on dividends. Therefore, it appears as if,
a clientele would wish to receive capital gains rather than dividends.
6DeAngelo et al. (2008) provide a survey on possible explanations on the dividend puzzle.
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